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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court continues to be the focal point
of the hopes and aspirations of millions of Americans who believe that the
civil rights revolution of the 1960s achieved a great deal but fell short of
its promise of racial equality. Polling data, which have taken the pulse of
United States race relations for the last six decades, show that racial and
ethnic minorities care much more about race relations than do Whites.'
African Americans, in particular, are pessimistic about race relations. Yet
quixotically, African Americans are also the racial group most likely to
believe that the United States Supreme Court should serve as the guard-
ian of civil rights for all Americans.'
These impulses are not contradictory. If polling data reflect reality
and not just perception, race relations have not significantly improved in
the last decade.' In fact, in daily interactions a racial minority is likely not
to be judged by the content of her character or the girth of her pocket
book but rather by the color of her skin.' Recent psychological and
sociological studies continue to show that on a day-to-day basis, racial
minorities suffer discrimination.' Research shows that children as young
as toddlers develop negative attitudes towards racial minorities, yet their
1. The Gallup Poll Social Audit, Black/White Relations in the United States (2003), reveals
that Blacks are more pessimistic than Whites about their political future. Patricia J. Williams,
Aren't We Happy Yet?, NATION, Aug. 6, 2001, at 11. Further, the poll shows that Blacks are
less optimistic regarding race relations than they were thirty-five years ago. Id.;
see also Ronald Roach, Gallup s Washington Debut, BL-cK ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 2,
2001, available at http://wwwfindarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mODXK/is_12_18/ai/77398862
(reporting that Gallup has been conducting the survey since 1997). Additionally, four in ten
White Americans, compared to one in ten Black Americans, feel Blacks are treated the
same as Whites in the United States. Id.
2. Williams, supra note 1, at 11.
3. Joan Biskubic, On Race, a Court Transformed, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/affirm/stories/aa1 21597.htm
(reporting that polls consistently show that the public has more confidence in the judici-
ary than in Congress or the White House).
4. See Williams, supra note 1,at 11.
5. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. Ray. 1161, 1211
(1995) (describing stereotypes as a subset of the "vast array" of structures that comprise
human cognition and concluding that discrimination therefore occurs not impulsively but
as the result of an accumulation of subtle distortions in perceiving objective data).
6. See, e.g., JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE,
CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE NATION (1995) (exploring the question of why, in the face of
discrimination and disparate economic circumstances, African Americans believe in the
American Dream as strongly as do Whites). The majority of African Americans report
experiencing discrimination, and in 1970 one-quarter reported discrimination "almost
every day of my life." Id. at 57, 60. Hochschild reports that African Americans recognize
increasingly that they are the victims of discrimination, which may thwart their ability to
succeed. Id. at 57,61.
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prejudiced attitudes do not necessarily correlate with their parents' views.
7
Another study reported that identical resumes, one with "White" names,
like Bill or Sue, another with "African American" names, like Tyrone or
Tamika, generated a 50% difference in offers for interviews favoring the
White names.8
Research such as this lends credence to critical race theorists
Richard Delgado and Daniel Farber's claim that racism is as hardwired
into American society as DNA is to a person's genetic code.9 While not
all race researchers ascribe to such fatalism, they do subscribe to the views
that racial conflict is a part of everyday social and political life and that
racial prejudice continues to touch the lives of America's racial minori-
ties."0 Moreover, clear signs show that racial tensions are on the rise. After
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many Americans viewed cer-
tain ethnic and religious minorities as a threat to the safety of the nation."
The United States Supreme Court has led revolutionary changes in
race relations. Consider how important Brown v. Board of Education12 was in
guiding American society down the troubled path of racial integration.
Consider also how much better off the United States has been for begin-
ning its racial revolution in the 1960s through the judiciary rather than
waiting for politicians to take the lead. 13 One need only think of South
7. Phyllis A. Katz, Racists or Tolerant Multiculturalists? How do they Begin?, 58 AM.
PSYCHOL. 897 (2003) (stating that by age three, both Black and White children show a
mild preference for members of their racial group that increases for White children by age
five or six but decreases for Black children; and noting that parental attitudes are only
somewhat influential, with many general social environmental facets likely playing a role
in the formation of racial attitudes).
8. Lani Guinier, Saving Affirmative Action, VILLAGE VOICE, July 2, 2003, available at
http://www.villiagevoice.com/news/0327,guinier,45235,1.htnl (referring to a January
2003 study conducted by MIT and the University of Chicago).
9. See Richard Delgado & Daniel A. Farber, Is American Law Inherently Racist?, 15 T.
M. COOLEY L. REv. 361, 373 (1998) (arguing that racism is inherent and intractable, like
DNA).
10. For an explanation of the variants of critical race theory, see CROSSROADS, Di-
RECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). See also
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE xiv-xv (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic
eds., 1995); Emc YAmAMOro, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN
Pos'r--CrvIL RIGHTS AMERICA 393-94 (1999).
11. See, e.g., Ahan Kim, Poll Finds Many Want Restrictions on Arab Americans; Nearly
Half Said Special Security Checks are Necessary, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 19, 2001
(reporting a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll in which 58% of those polled favored requir-
ing Arabs, including those who are U.S. citizens, to undergo special, more intensive
security checks before boarding airplanes in the U.S., and 49% favored requiring Arabs,
including those who are U.S. citizens, to carry a special ID).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. See MichaelJ. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. R-Ev. 7, 77-85 (1994) (supporting the view that Brown effected a transformation of
the social order). For a more skeptical take on Brown, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CoURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 49-54, 107-56 (1991),
FALL 2004]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
Africa's post-apartheid troubles to begin to comprehend how costly the
delay ofjust race relations can be to a nation."
Nevertheless, there is a noticeable difference between the United
States Supreme Court led by Justice Warren in the late 1960s and the
Court currently led by Justice Rehnquist. One way to characterize the
last fifteen years of race relations jurisprudence under Chief Justice
Rehnquist is that a slight majority of the Court-five Justices to be ex-
act-has cut back on the civil rights decisions of the Warren Court. Most
notably, this majority has intervened in areas formerly left to the political
process. The Rehnquist Court's record in interpreting the Commerce
Clause,5 Tenth Amendment,'6 Eleventh Amendment,' 7 and most recently
the Equal Protection Clause'8 shows that it is confident that its own in-
which argues that many scholars have overrated the impact of Brown. For a recent collec-
tion of varying perspectives on Brown, see Symposium, Brown at Fifty, 117 HARV. L. REv.
1301 (2004).
14. For a general discussion of the progress in race relations in South Africa, see
MARTtIA MINow, BEWWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENEss: FACING HISToRY AFTER GENO-
CIDE AND MAssVIoi.ECE (1998).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (holding that
the Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority be-
cause the statute did not constitute regulation of activity that substantially affected
interstate commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (redefining
interstate commerce more narrowly than prior case law to encompass only regulation of:
(1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and
(3) activities that have a "substantial relation" to interstate commerce). See generally Randy
E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an "Activist" Court? The Commerce Clause Cases, 73 U.
CoLO. L. Ray. 1275 (2002).
16. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 177 (1992) (holding that
Congress exceeded its regulatory power and violated the Tenth Amendment when it ef-
fectively coerced states to take title of nuclear waste).
17. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-74 (2001) (holding that Con-
gress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from private suits for damages
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
(extending sovereign immunity to bar private lawsuits by state employees under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, reasoning that Congress under its Article I powers could not abrogate
state sovereign immunity); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (rejecting the
proposition that Congress, acting under its Commerce Clause power, could abrogate state
sovereign immunity). The limited effect of the Eleventh Amendment appropriately leads
many commentators to question the Court's choice to express federalism values through
sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the
Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. Rav. 429, 493-94 (2002) ("Sovereign
immunity does not restrict the regulatory power of Congress, it seldom bars suits for in-
junctions to force compliance with federal law, and it does not protect local governments
at all. Why, then, has the Court made sovereign immunity a centerpiece of its drive to
revive constitutional federalism?").
18. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103, 110 (2000) (per curiam) (halting re-
count ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that could have determined the winner of
the 2000 election by an actual vote count, holding that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause). Justice John Paul Stevens in, dissent observed, "Although we may never know
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the
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terpretive judgment should trump the judgments of Congress and state
courts and legislatures. 9
The five Justice coalition, made up of Justices Rehnquist, Thomas,
Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy, has refashioned constitutional law in ar-
eas of great import to minorities: from antidiscrimination law to
affirmative action"1 to minority voting rights.2 2 Because these issues are
difficult and complex, most members of majority and minority racial
groups diverge in how they characterize the problem. This phenomenon is
nowhere as clear as in the area of affirmative action. While there is great
heterogeneity in Whites' views on affirmative action, with substantial num-
bers of Whites both opposing and supporting its various forms, support is
more uniform among African Americans. 3 This divergence can be traced,
in part, to differences in values and political orientation. However, data
identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an im-
partial guardian of the rule of law." Id. at 128-29 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
19. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have called this shift in constitutional doctrine
a conservative "revolution." See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Con-
stitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. Rav. 1045 (2001); see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court, 2000 Term, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. Rv. 4, 130-58 (2001) (characteriz-
ing the Rehnquist Court's conservative jurisprudence as a turn to absolutism).
20. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (denying standing to
Alabama resident alleging a TideVI violation).
21. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that
federal affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny review); City of Rich-
mond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that municipal
affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny review).
22. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that reapportionment that
is drawn predominantly to group voters of the same race together is unconstitutional un-
der the Equal Protection Clause); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910-15, 920
(1995) (holding that a voting district could be invalidated if, instead of traditional district-
ing principles, race was the motivating factor in drawing district lines, because the Equal
Protection Clause protects individual racial dignity of majorities and minorities alike).
Continuing the line of reasoning in Adarand and Croson, the Miller Court asserted that
when a state assigns voters to voting districts on the basis of race, it engages in racial
stereotyping and thereby demeans the individual dignity of the voter. Id. at 911-12. To do
so means that the decision has been made based on an underlying assumption that voters
of the same race "think alike." Id. at 912 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647). Race-conscious
gerrymandering is especially disunifying of the polity because it carries the threat of"bal-
kanizing us into competing racial factions." Id. at 912 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657).
23. The Gallup Poll's report on Black/White Relations in the United States showed
that 82% of African Americans said that the government should increase or keep affirma-
tive action programs while half that number of Whites said the same. THE GALLuP POLL
Soc. AuDIT, BLAcK/WHTE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, ExEcuTivE SUMMARY (May
2001). 70% of Whites believed instead that African Americans should focus on improving
themselves. Id.; see also ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL Or INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND
RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S "RAcIAL" CRISIS 148-58 (1997) (examining poll data on af-
firmative action programs).
24. A supra-majority of African Americans identify as Democrats. DAVID A. BOSITIS,
JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL AND ECON. STUDIES, 2004 NATIONAL OPINION POLL: POLITICS
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also show that how one experiences life in America, as either a White
person or a racial minority, is a salient determinant in one's view on af-
firmative action." Sophisticated studies on racial attitudes and affirmative
action have factored out variables such as ideological values, political ori-
entation, education, and income.2' Although the gap in attitudes on this
highly polemical issue is much smaller than previously thought, race re-
mains the single most important variable in accounting for differences in
attitudes towards affirmative action.
27
These studies demonstrate how racial perspective can determine what
side a person takes on issues. However, courts generally do not
acknowledge that racial identity may influence the analysis of racial hot-
button issues.28 One might argue that a court's decision to ignore the
influence of race might be beneficial for society because courts are not
competent to make such complex judgments.29 The response to this
argument is twofold. First, constitutional judgments are visibly biased
AND THE NATIONAL ELECTION, available at http://www.jointcenter.org/publications/details/
opinion-poll/nop-Politics.pdf. In 2004, the Joint Center for Political and Economic Stud-
ies conducted an opinion poll of 1,642 Black respondents in a national survey and asked
whether respondents identified themselves as Democrats, Independents, or Republicans.
Id. 63% claimed to be Democrats, down from 74% in 2000. Id. In 2004, younger African
Americans were more likely to identify as Democrats than older African Americans. Id. As
Professor Terry Smith has argued, a high percentage of Blacks may be Democrats because
the Democratic Party supports the ideas and policies in which many African Americans
believe. See generally Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endan-
gered Two-Party Paradigm, 48 DUscE L.J. 1 (1998).
25. See James Kluegel, "If There Isn't a Problem, You Don't Need a Solution": The Bases
of Contemporary Affirmative-Action Attitudes, 28 AM. BsHAV. Sci. 761, 771 (1985) (finding that
the majority of Whites assume a "lack among [B]lacks of the proper motivation and the
skills needed to achieve" is the cause for the Black-White difference in socioeconomic
status);James R. Kluegel & Eliot R. Smith, Whites' Beliefs about Blacks' Opportunity, 47 AM.
Soc. REV. 518, 523 (1982) (finding that "a large segment of the [W]hite population views
[B]lacks' opportunity as better than average due to reverse discrimination").
26. See, e.g., DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DivIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL
POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIc IDEALS 53-60, 83-88, 174-82 (1996). Donald Kinder and Lynn
Sanders found opinions on affirmative action to be significantly influenced by what
Whites as a group perceived to be the impact of affirmative action programs on Whites.
Almost 60% of Whites thought that affirmative action had impacted negatively on Whites
by reducing job chances, admissions into higher education, and promotions. Id. at 83-85.
About 40% of Whites believed that affirmative action policies operated to their disadvan-
tage relative to Blacks regarding job opportunities and entry into elite schools for their
children. Id. at 68. Kinder and Sanders examined the data and concluded that such percep-
tions were not realistic. Id. at 66-68.
27. Kluegel, supra note 25, at 771.
28. For elaboration on this point, see Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion:
Reconceptualizing the Role of the Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L. RE. 150, 160-84
(1999) [hereinafter LazosVargas, Democracy and Inclusion].
29. Cf Michael W McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 19 HAv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 457 (1996) (making same argument in the context of
Brown).
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when the Supreme Court or other courts selectively strip out social and
racial context to conform with the identity-based views of the majority.
For example, the lesser opportunities that Asian Americans, Latinos, and
African Americans have when they enter the labor market because of
racial discrimination (remember how much worse off Tamika is than
Sue)3" will remain harms for which the law will not afford relief. While
colorblindness may be a seemingly neutral constitutional principle, the
courts should not arrive at any constitutional rule through a truncated
characterization of the salient social and racial contexts.
31
Second, at some level the Court does incorporate a racial perspective
even when it claims that racial context does not matter. For example, in
overruling the Warren Court's affirmative action decisions, the Rehnquist
Court majority fashioned a new constitutional equal protection principle:
the right of any individual, regardless of race, to be judged on the basis of
her own merit and be free from generalizations based on race.32 The
Court is right that this principle reflects cultural values of American
society.33 However, as a constitutional rule of law, this statement takes sides
in a debate that splits along racial lines.While most in the White majority
tend to emphasize that group identity should not trump individual
merit,34 for most racial minorities historical discrimination looms large.
African Americans," Mexican Americans in the Southwest and
California,36 and Asian Americans37 experienced caste-like segregation and
30. See supra text accompanying note 8.
31. LazosVargas, Democracy and Inclusion, supra note 28, at 160-84.
32. See Adarand v. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 235-37 (1995) (holding that the federal mi-
nority set aside program at issue required strict scrutiny review to determine whether a
compelling government interest was furthered by racial classifications and whether the
program was narrowly tailored); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505
(1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that Richmond's minority contract set aside program
was a rigid racial quota unsupported by any findings of discrimination made by the City).
33. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211; Croson, 488 U.S. at 470 (plurality opinion).
34. ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & STEPHEN J. ROSE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS,
RcE/ETHNICrY, AND SELECTIVE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 8 (2003), available at http://
www.tcforg/Publications/Education/carnevale-rose.pdf. According to Anthony Carnevale
and Stephen Rose, Americans "strongly associate affirmative action with racial preferences
and do not view racial preferences favorably. Among White Americans, 52% say affirmative
action should be abolished, and more than 80% oppose preference in hiring and promotions
for racial minorities, even when the programs may help compensate for 'past discrimina-
tion'" Id. (citations omitted).
35. See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss, FROM SLAVERY TO FREE-
DOM:A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS (7th ed. 2003).
36. See generally TOMAs ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULTLINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA (1994); Ram6n Eduardo Ruiz, Introduction to FOREIGN-
ERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE MEXICAN AMERICANS (David J.
Weber ed., 1973).
37. See generally RONALD TAKAIi, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY
OF ASIAN AMERICANS (1989).
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were systematically stripped of property rights, educational opportunities,
and high paying jobs. Such historical caste-like experiences have present
effects. Recent studies report that the average middle class White family
has seven to eleven times more accumulated wealth than the average
African American middle class family.38 Also, racial minorities suffer day-
to-day transactional discrimination (again recall Tamika's lot versus
Sue's).39
In sum, race matters, but judges and courts have failed to fashion a
rule of law that is inclusive of all racial perspectives and realities in the
United States.The reason for this dismal performance lies in how predomi-
nantly White judges, and therefore courts, conceptualize race. Part I
illustrates this proposition by analyzing the Rehnquist Court's recent race
relations jurisprudence in three Supreme Court decisions handed down in4 41'4
2003: Grutter v. Bollinger, " Gratz v. Bollinger, and Georgia v. Ashcroft. 2 Even
as the United States Supreme Court entered increasingly complex areas of
race relations, the Court continued to apply a simplistic concept of how
race functions. The result is that without theoretical grounding, the devel-
opment of constitutional doctrine in this controversial and divisive area
appears to be ad hoc and arbitrary.
Making the bench more diverse could be an avenue that leads to a
better understanding of racial issues by judges and thus could result in an
inclusive rule of law that takes into account both majority and minority
racial perspectives. Part II examines the empirical literature as to whether
greater diversity of the bench actually leads to different rule-making and
concludes that the evidence is equivocal. But rather than concluding that
gender and racial diversity have no impact on the rule of law, it may be
fairer to assert that empirical research simply has not yet been able to ade-
quately test the hypothesis that the presence of more minorities on the
bench could lead to an inclusive rule of law.
Part III first proposes a theory of how a pluralistic process-based
model ofjudging could achieve a more inclusive rule of law. In a pluralistic
process-based model of judging, courts are charged with: first, getting the
38. ASSET DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, ASSET DEVELOPMENT AND WHY ASSETS MATTER
(citing MELVIN OLIVER & THIOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PER-
SPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1997)), available at http://www.results.org/website/
article.asp?id=735 (last visited Feb. 26, 2005); see also Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cro-
nyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind
and Race Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1003 (1997) (arguing
that transactional discrimination provides constitutional justification for affirmative action
programs); Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion and Campaign Fi-
nance, 80 TEX. L. Rxv. 988 (2002) (discussing impact of racial wealth inequality on
politics).
39. See supra text accompanying note 8.
40. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
41. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
42. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
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content "right" of minimum substantive rights; second, ensuring that in the
development of the rule of law, the realities of both racial majorities and
racial minorities are incorporated; and third, being cognizant that courts
must balance their role as ultimate constitutional decision-maker with def-
erence to the political process. The give and take of political disagreement
might allow majorities and minorities the opportunity to work out deep
disagreements. This model is admittedly difficult to attain in reality.
Nonetheless, Part III then proposes that true diversity on the bench is
a minimum prerequisite to achieving such a judicial ethic and that Grutter v.
Bollinger can be read to support this proposition. Grutter holds that it is a
legitimate state objective for key democratic institutions, like a public uni-
versity (or in the instant case a judicial body), to want to achieve discursive
diversity.43 A state decision-maker may set a goal that institutional dialogue
be inclusive of the different realities of racial majorities and minorities. In
the case of a public university, this environment leads to better training of
leaders; in the case of a judicial body, a diverse discursive environment could
lead to a more inclusive rule of law. The Court observes in Grutter that
race-conscious selection of participants to achieve a critical mass of minori-
ties to engender a robust racial dialogue between majorities and minorities
is a "narrowly tailored" means for achieving the goal of creating a diverse
discursive body.44 The lesson from Grutter is that to achieve a diverse judicial
bench, diversity must be understood to go beyond token appointments of
minority judges, and instead the goal should be to achieve a critical mass of
minority judges on each bench. Only then can we expect that minority
and majority judicial colleagues will engage in robust racial dialogue that
can lead to the fashioning of an inclusive rule of law.
Part IV examines how politics work against achieving a critical mass
of minority judges on the bench. In the "real world" the goal of achieving
greater diversity on the bench-let alone achieving a critical mass of mi-
nority judges-faces dismal prospects. First, the ugly politics of judicial
nominations means that minority appointees can be easily shot down. Sec-
ond, the reality of how stereotypes work against minorities means that
minority candidates in judicial elections often lose.
This Article concludes that political dialogue engendered by contro-
versial minority judicial nominations, like those of Miguel Estrada and
Janice Rogers Brown, 5 could be an avenue to educating the polity as to
43. 539 U.S. at 325.
44. 539 U.S. at 334.
45. Miguel Estrada withdrew his name from consideration for a seat on the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit after Senate Democrats
filibustered for over two years to block his appointment. CNN, Estrada Withdraws asJudidal
Nominee (Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter CNN, Estrada Withdraws], at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/ALLPOLITICS/09/04/estrada.withdraws/. On February 14, 2005, President
George W Bush resubmitted his nomination ofJanice Rogers Brown to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to the Senate, which blocked her
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why it is important to achieve greater minority representation on the
bench. The pluralistic process-based model of judging advocates that a
critical mass of diverse judges be achieved, not that the minority judges
be liberal rather than conservative, communitarian rather than individual-
ist, or Democrat rather than Republican. The goal is that there be a
critical mass of minority judges on benches that make decisions as a
group, like circuit courts and supreme courts. This ideal is one towards
which pluralist polities must strive.
I.THE REHNQUIST COURT'S FORMALISM
IN RACE RELATIONS
In the 2002-2003 Term, the United States Supreme Court handed
down three very important cases concerning racial issues. In the area of
affirmative action, Grutter v. Bollinger 46 and Gratz v. Bollinger47 represented the
Court's first doctrinal pronouncement since Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,48 decided tweiity-five years earlier. These cases affirmed
the legitimacy of affirmative action in public higher education but made
it more difficult for public institutions that wish to continue employing
affirmative action in higher education to be confident that their programs
would withstand constitutional scrutiny. In the area of voting rights, Geor-
gia v. Ashcroft 9 scaled back the Voting'Rights Act's ("VRA") hard and fast
rule that obliged certain covered jurisdictions not to undermine minority
voting power. In both areas, a theoretically grounded racial perspective
would have aided the Court in resolving these questions and, just as im-
portantly, would have made it easier to implement the Court's dictates.
A. Affirmative Action: Grutter v. Bollinger
and Gratz v. Bollinger
The affirmative action cases of the 2002-2003 Term were long-
awaited. Some hoped that these cases would sound the death-knell of
affirmative action everywhere. Instead, in Grutter v. Bollinger the Court
affirmed that public institutions could continue to use affirmative action
nomination during Bush's first term in office. Associated Press, Bush Resends 20 Judicial
Nominees (Feb. 15, 2005), at http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/02/15/
bush.judges.ap/. Bush first nominated Brown on July 25, 2003. CNN, Bush to Resubmit
Blocked.Judicial Nominees (Dec. 24, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/
12/23/bush.judiciary/.
46. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
47. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
48. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
49. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
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programs to achieve diverse learning environments."0 This result is positive
for race relations because it affirms that engaging difficult issues surround-
ing race relations through pedagogy is a legitimate goal for a public
university. However, all of the Grutter opinions undertheorized why
race-consciousness matters in this context and why diverse discursive
environments are important for universities and pluralist democracies.
Both proponents and opponents of affirmative action expected
Justice O'Connor's to be the swing vote in both of these hotly contested
cases. Thus they cast their arguments in ways they hoped would woo
Justice O'Connor's vote.
Prior to the 2002-2003 Term, Justice O'Connor's vision of affirma-
tive action had already been developing and can be discerned through
two landmark cases. In 1989,Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opin-
ion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company-1 that overturned a
municipal "set aside" program under which a governmental entity could
award designated groups (women and racial or ethnic minorities) "plus
points" in competitive bidding programs or could "set aside" a certain
percentage of government procurement contracts for members of these
groups. 2 In 1995, in Adarand v. Peha,53 she authored the five Justice major-
ity decision that overturned earlier case law that had endorsed federal set
aside programs. 4
Justice O'Connor's Adarand opinion, which closely tracked her ear-
lier plurality opinion in Croson, set new standards for the review of
affirmative action programs. The Court would apply the highest level of
scrutiny--strict scrutiny-to affirmative action programs even if the gov-
ernmental program were attempting to remedy an agency's own past
racial harms.5 The highest level of scrutiny applied, according to Justice
O'Connor, because race-based governmental decision-making is inherently
suspect. 6 Too often stereotypes creep in and limit the opportunities of indi-
viduals. She directly cited how stereotypes affected early nineteenth century
decisions by state legislatures that barred women from voting and practicing
law 7 Decisions and policies that are premised on generalizations about
50. 539 U.S. at 325 (finding "student body diversity is a compelling state interest
that can justify the use of race in university admissions").
51. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
52. Id. at 502, 506 (plurality opinion).
53. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
54. Id. at 204-05.
55. See id. at 227 (describing race as a "group classification" subject to strict scrutiny
to ensure the "personal right to equal protection") (emphasis omitted).
56. Id. at 223-24.
57. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-27, 729-30 (1982)
(holding that a gender classification proponent "must carry the burden of showing an 'ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification' ... that the classification serves 'important governmental
objectives."' "When lawmakers enact statutes that classify according to gender, the State
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supposed characteristics of gender or racial groups perpetuate the very
stereotypes that such policies intend to combat."s This type of stereotyping
also belittles the dignity of individuals by treating them only as part of a
group and consequentially not valuing their individual merit or achieve-
ments.5 9
Croson and Adarand established that the "fit" between the general
purpose of any affirmative action program and the means used to enact it
would be carefully scrutinized by the courts.6" For example, in Croson, the
Court found that allowing certain ethnic groups, like Aleuts, to benefit
from the set aside program made no sense given the overall purpose of
the plan.6"
Finally, the Rehnquist Court held that merely aiming to improve
race relations was not a legitimate governmental purpose.62 Ongoing
racial discrimination was "'too amorphous; 63 and remedies aimed at
curing historical discrimination had no end in sight.' Given the harms to
must demonstrate a "direct, substantial relationship between objective and means.") (cita-
tions omitted).
58. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545
(1980) (Stevens,J., dissenting)); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 US. 547,604 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that "policies may embody stereotypes that treat
individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts-their very
worth as citizens"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion) (noting that "classifications
based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm" because "they may in fact promote
notions of racial inferiority").
59. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion) ("To whatever racial group these
citizens belong, their 'personal rights' to be treated with equal dignity and respect are im-
plicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public
decisionmaking.").
60. Id. (plurality opinion); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (finding that such pro-
grams must be narrowly tailored so that the remedial program is proportional and
addresses the identified injury).
61. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (plurality opinion) (finding that the inclusion of"Span-
ish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons" was a gross overinclusion in light
of the program's remedial purpose: to address Jim Crow contracting practices by the city).
62. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; Croson, 488 U.S. at 486 (plurality opinion).
63. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (quoting W~ygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
276 (1986) (plurality opinion)); see .Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (plurality opinion) (asserting
that past harms are "inherently unmeasurable claims" and that courts should not be asked
to "'evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered'" because" 'such a
result would be contrary to ... equality' ") (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 296-97 (1978) (opinion of Powel,J.)).
64. Croson, 488 U.S. at 496-97 (plurality opinion) (remedying the effects of societal
discrimination may be ageless in its reach into the past) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307
(opinion of Powell, J.)); id. at 498 (plurality opinion) (stating that a "generalized assertion
... [ofl past discrimination ... 'has no logical stopping point' ") (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S.
at 275 (plurality opinion)).
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individual Whites, such ill-defined governmental programs could not be
constitutionally legitimate."
Grutter v. Bollinger6 and Gratz v. Bollinger7 in no way reversed the
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence in the affirmative action area. In Grutter,
the Supreme Court approved the affirmative action program used in ad-
missions by the University of Michigan Law School ("Law School"); 68 in
Gratz, the Court struck down the program used in the University of
Michigan ("Michigan") undergraduate admissions. 69 In both decisions, the
Court extended the application of the principles that Justice O'Connor
announced in Croson and Adarand.7" The Court also affirmed Justice Pow-
ell's opinion from Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.7 ' First, the
Court confirmed that it is a legitimate state purpose for public universi-
ties to attempt to achieve racial diversity, as the University of Michigan
and its law school sought to do with their affirmative action programs.
7
1
Under the principles of the split Bakke decision, achieving diversity in
university admissions is a legitimate state purpose because this choice is
protected under academic freedom principles based in the First Amend-
ment.7 3 In Grutter, O'Connor went further than Justice Powell and found
65. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 230 (asserting that "any individual suffers an injury
when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race, whatever
that race may be").
66. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
67. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
68. 539 U.S. at 337-40.
69. 539 U.S. at 275-76.
70. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (holding plan unconstitutional because of the city's failure to demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest justifying its hiring plan and the fact that the plan was
not narrowly tailored to remedy effects of prior discrimination); see also Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 227 (holding that racial classifications imposed by a federal, state, or local governmental
actor must be analyzed by the reviewing court under strict scrutiny; in other words, such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further a
compelling governmental interest).
71. See 438 U.S. 265,269 (1978) (opinion of Powell,J.).
72. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-34. Justice O'Connor explicitly noted that the
Court has "never held that the only governmental use of race that can survive strict scru-
tiny is remedying past discrimination." Id. at 328. She then explained that "the Law
School's admissions policy promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and enables [students] to better understand persons of different races." Id. at
330 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted). She further noted the
"learning outcomes" associated with diversity, such as better preparing students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society; promoting classroom discussion that is "livelier,
more spirited, and simply more enlightening"; and providing the "skills needed in today's
increasingly global marketplace." Id.
73. See id. at 387 (KennedyJ., dissenting) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-14 (opinion
of Powell, J.)) ("Justice Powell's approval of the use of race in university admissions [in
Bakke] reflected a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a uni-
versity's conception of its educational mission.").
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another basis for diversity in public higher education: that it promoted
democratic principles.'4 In particular, O'Connor noted that in a democ-
racy, "it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."'5
The difference in outcomes between Grutter and Gratz is explained
by the way each of these programs factored race into the admissions proc-
ess. The key difference for Justice O'Connor was the fit. In Gratz, the
Court held that Michigan's undergraduate program failed to meet the
ends-means strict scrutiny analysis.7 Michigan utilized a point system for
admissions, awarding some applicants twenty points for membership in a
racial group, being a star athlete, or coming from a poor background.
7
Legacies, children of alumni, received a one to four point advantage.71 Jus-
tice O'Connor found this system to be too systemically race-conscious
and not sufficiently individualized, and she explained that the undergradu-
ate admissions "policy stands in sharp contrast to the [L]aw [S]chool's
admissions plan, which enables admissions officers to make nuanced judg-
ments with respect to the contributions each applicant is likely to make to
the diversity of the incoming class."'8 The Law School's race-conscious ad-
missions program allowed the admissions officer to consider race as one
among many factors in determining admissions, rather than as serving as a
twenty point trump card as in the undergraduate program."0 The Law
School process provided the necessary level of individualization and inter-
jected evaluative judgments in the admissions decision that effectively
removed race as a defining feature.'
74. For a full discussion of how Justice O'Connor's majority opinion follows a de-
mocratic theoretical justification, see Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gate of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HAv. L. Ray 113 (2003).
75. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. Justice O'Connor linked diversity to the institutional
mission of higher education: "[O]ur view [is) that attaining a diverse student body is at the
heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission." Id. at 329.
76. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,270 (2003).
77. Description of University of Michigan Former Undergraduate Admissions Policy, at
http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/archivedocs/uapolicy.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2005).
78. Id.
79. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 279 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
80. See id. at 256 (stating that underrepresented minority applicants were automati-
cally awarded twenty points toward the total needed for admission).
81. Id. at 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring).Justice O'Connor wrote that admissions
policies "must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an indi-
vidual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of
his or her application." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003).Justice O'Connor
cited as proof of the Law School's truly "individualized consideration" the fact that it "se-
riously weighs many other diversity factors besides race." Id. at 338. She approvingly noted
the Law School's "highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file," emphasiz-
ing that "[t]he Law School does not, however, limit in any way the broad range of qualities
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The Court also affirmed Justice Powell's Bakke opinion by making
clear that remedying past discrimination is not the only legitimate state
purpose. The University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action
program passed constitutional muster because it aimed to "attai[n] a di-
verse student body." Although Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Rehnquist, and
Thomas viewed the mechanics of the University of Michigan Law
School's approach to be the functional equivalent of a quota system,
4 Jus-
tice O'Connor accepted the Law School's claim that it wanted to achieve
a "critical mass" of minorities in the Law School that would stimulate the
robust exchange of racial perspectives in discussions in class and informal
settings.8" The majority opinion did not define "critical mass" but rather
accepted the claim that this functional concept was critical to the Law
School's academic goal of achieving a dialogic diverse environment.8"
Grutter represents an advance in the Court's understanding of race
relations." Justice O'Connor accepted the Law School's arguments that
perspectives and experiences of racial minorities should be voiced and
acknowledged in the education process.8 She acknowledged that elite
institutions are gatekeepers to key leadership positions in our society and
that affirmative action programs aimed at increasing the diversity of racial
experiences that students may encounter provide the skill-set needed in
"today's increasingly global marketplace"8 9 Society suffers if access to
leadership becomes a gate through which only, or mostly, Whites enter.9°
Justice O'Connor deferred to the Law School's judgment that a critical
mass of minority students, not just a token presence, is necessary to ensure
a healthy dialogue on race. Justice O'Connor recognized that having a
and experiences that may be considered valuable contributions to student body diversity."
Id.
82. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 379-87 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 330. If the Law School were to "assure within its student body some
specified percentage," then the admissions program would fail. Id. at 329-30 (quoting Re-
gents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell,J.)). However,
because the law school defined "critical mass" in relation to educational benefits, the pro-
gram fit within what Powell had found in Bakke to be a legitimate state objective:
increasing diversity of viewpoints in the classroom. Id. at 330.
86. See id. at 330.
87. See Guinier, supra note 74, at 113.
88. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 ("[N]umerous studies show that student body diver-
sity promotes learning outcomes....").
89. Id. at 330-31. Justice O'Connor points out that both Fortune 500 companies
and military leaders viewed "diversity" skills and trained minority leaders as essential for
the United States to maintain a competitive edge. Id.
90. Id. at 330-32.Justice O'Connor cites Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the
University of Texas Law School segregation case from the Jim Crow era, when stating that
"the path to leadership [must] be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
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handful of minority students in a class is not sufficient to promote racial
dialogue or understanding among students, or defeat racial stereotypes.
The conclusion that the Court has relaxed strict scrutiny in the con-
text of public education is inescapable. Grutter and Gratz take a step back
from earlier decisions and begin a new doctrinal line of analysis for race
relations cases. The strict scrutiny standard, established by Croson and
Adarand for government contracts and benefits, is, in application, very
strict.91 The Court's open skepticism as to proper purpose and proper tailor-
ing makes fashioning government contract set aside programs that benefit
minorities under the narrow tailoring standard a daunting task. In Grutter,
the Court defers to the Law School's public mission and educational goals
in the classroom and does not extend its inquiry into how admissions of-
ficers make decisions. This more relaxed form of strict scrutiny is justified,
one can infer, because racial diversity in elite public education (which
leads to leadership roles and prestigious jobs) impacts the civic aspects of
our society. All-White leadership in the military, businesses, and the public
sector would have a detrimental effect on a citizen's understanding of
"work and citizenship"92 and the promise that all democratic societies
must make the avenues to the upper echelons of society open to all.
At the same time, Grutter and Gratz maintain the scheme established
under Bakke that affirmative action programs will receive close judicial
scrutiny. University of Michigan policies favoring athletes and children of
alumni do not receive any judicial scrutiny as to purpose or fit because
they only require rational basis review. By contrast, programs aimed at
racial minorities are subjected to strict scrutiny, making these vulnerable
to legal change. Public schools must thread the needle between the ad-
missions procedures approved and rejected in Grutter and Gratz,
respectively. This fine line can be walked only by increasing administrative
costs to those institutions that wish to pursue affirmative action policies.
In spite of the Court's affirmation of affirmative action as an impor-
tant tool in the civic and business life of America, the path down which
the Court is heading in its affirmative action doctrine is riddled with un-
answered questions. Grutter makes clear that the key to a constitutionally
valid affirmative action program is that each student's file receives indi-
vidualized review. But should the Court give so much deference to
91. For example, in light of the City of Richmond's Jim Crow past, in Croson, Jus-
tice O'Connor essentially demanded that the City document how its past discriminatory
actions were to be remedied by its contract set aside programs. City of Richmond v.J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,498-99 (1989) (plurality opinion).
92. See Guinier, supra note 74, at 153-54; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 ("We have
repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for work and
citizenship, describing education as pivotal to 'sustaining our political and cultural heritage'
.... This Court has long recognized that 'education ... is the very foundation of good
citizenship.' ") (second omission in original) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
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admissions officers in determining which minorities can provide the right
critical mass and racial insights that benefit a classroom discussion?" In
Grutter, the Court does not look beyond the admissions officer's door to
inquire whether the officer's individual review of the files actually utilizes
criteria that create a diverse classroom.
94
The failure to delve into these difficult issues may be commended,
because judicial prudence dictates that a court should not go far beyond
the case at hand. Addressing these issues, however, would do much to start
explaining how and why race matters in higher education.
The Court concluded in Grutter that race matters a great deal in
democracies." But the Court held in Croson and Adarand that race-
conscious policies can be constitutionally impermissible. 96 The chasm be-
tween these cases highlights that the Court is hesitant to develop
constitutional guidelines as to when and why race matters; we have only
pieces that we can attempt to patch together.
The discomfort with Grutter and Gratz comes from the fact that
admissions officers and public universities are free to articulate their own
visions of why race matters. Such unbounded discretion nets confusion
and anxiety and leaves the impression that affirmative action policies en-
able naked racial preferences. Should a law school admissions officer give
preference to a White Argentinean who has always resided in Latin Amer-
ica and comes from one of the elite families of the country; to a
Vietnamese immigrant who survived the fall of Saigon; or to an African
American who grew up in the affluent suburbs of Washington, D.C. but
whose great grandparents were slaves in Mississippi? Which applicants
contribute more or less to the diversity of viewpoints in the classroom?
These questions are not answered in any imaginable reading of Grutter or
Gratz. Instead these decisions are left to the discretion of the admissions
officer to sort out as best she can. But at this ministerial level, the officer
needs to have some working understanding of how the "race" experience
of each of these different applicants might add to the diversity goals of the
institution.
93. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("The Law School's educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.... Our scrutiny
of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into account complex
educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the univer-
sity.").
94. See id. at 393-95 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
95. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
96. Adarand v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 229-32 (1995) (holding that rigorous review of
federal minority set aside programs is necessary to ensure that racial characteristics are not
improperly being used by governmental decision-makers); Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-93
(plurality opinion) (holding that race-conscious affirmative action programs are impermis-
sible when governmental decision-makers overly rely on generalizations based on racial
classifications and do not narrowly tailor remedial affirmative action programs).
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To give clearer guidelines, the Court would have to articulate a
theory of why race matters in academic discussion or why disagreements
between reasonable people might be centered around different racial
perspectives. Race is not only a status or a phenotype but also an
experience in modern America. When a racial minority "experiences" race,
she experiences discrimination, lesser opportunities, and ascriptions by
others of who she is and what she thinks based on demeaning racial
stereotypes. A White person experiences race as well, but she experiences
her race as "White privilege," not having to think about possible encounters
with discrimination, generally enjoying greater opportunities, and
benefiting from positive ascriptions as to her abilities based solely on
presumptions of what White people can do.97 Such an understanding of
race could help guide the admissions officer's decision-making: the
economically privileged White Argentinean is likely never to have
experienced the disadvantages of race and therefore should likely not be
admitted under a racial affirmative action program. On the other hand, a
Vietnamese immigrant and an affluent African American from the suburbs
are both very likely to have experienced race as racial minorities, albeit in
very different ways because of their class, status, and racial group's history
in this country. Both applicants are more likely to have experienced
stereotypes, discrimination, or lesser opportunities in life because of their
race. Each has the potential to contribute racially diverse viewpoints born
from their diverse racial experiences in America.
Grutter omits such explanation. One reason lies in the awkward con-
tradictions between the Grutter and Gratz results. In the Court's own
prior "colorblind" jurisprudence in Croson and Adarand, the Court found
race-conscious programs unconstitutional because they impermissibly
stereotyped racial minorities by making assumptions of who they were
and how they thought. But another reason is more fundamental: the
Court is extremely wary of talking about race because it lacks the confi-
dence to make such pronouncements. The Court is essentially a White
institution which, despite the presence ofJustice Clarence Thomas, lacks a
diversity of racial viewpoints.
B. Minority Voting Rights: Georgia v. Ashcroft
At the same time the Supreme Court was trimming back affirmative
action programs in the public sector, it applied "colorblind" race
principles that it had fashioned in the affirmative action area to voting
rights jurisprudence. At first glance, this may appear to be an odd
97. See generally RuT FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993); STEPHANIE M.WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE RaEVEALED:
How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996) (stating that ability to avoid
consequences of racial power is a form ofWhite privilege).
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transference. However, as Abigail Thernstrom noted a decade ago, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,9' as amended in 1982, inserted affirmative
action into the voting area. 9 Enacted by Congressional authority under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the VRA attempted to ensure
that minorities were able to elect the "candidates of their choice" to
public office."N The legislative history and text of the statute make clear
that the legislature did not desire proportional representation. ' The
problem it identified was the scarcity of minority representatives in
Congress, and it determined that federal action was necessary to
counteract the political maneuvering of entrenched White politicians that
made it difficult for minority representatives to be elected."2
The VIRA, according to political science studies, has achieved its
purpose of increasing minority voices in the political process. 103 More than
any other single factor, litigation under the VRA accounts for the increased
representation of racial and ethnic minorities in state legislatures and
Congress.' 4 In spite of such successes, minority representation in Congress
and state houses remains very low. In 2002, thirty-seven African American,
twenty-two Latino, and four Asian American representatives served in the
House of Representatives.' According to recent studies, the number of
African American, Latino, and Asian American elected officials stands at
about 3% of the nation's 513,200 total representatives.' Essentially, a
minority representative will not be elected to a state or national
legislature unless she is running in a "majority minority" district-a
district where the majority of voters are minorities."7 This reflects the
98. 42 U.S.C. 5§ 1971-1973bb-1 (2003).
99. See generally ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE Ac-
TION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987).An updated version of her critique appears in
Abigail Thernstrom, More Notesfrom a Political Thicket, 44 EMORY L.J. 911 (1995).
100. 42 U.S.C. 5 1973b.
101. See Thomas M. Boyd & StephenJ. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting
Rights Act:A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983) (providing a useful
compilation of the legislative history of the VRA).
102. Id.
103. See Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, Introduction to QUIET REVOLUTION
IN THE SoUrrH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofinan eds., 1994).
104. Id.
105. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, The Latinalo and APIA Vote Post-2000: What Does It
Mean To Move Beyond "Black And White" Politics?, 81 OR. L. REv. 784, 826 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter LazosVargas, The Latina/o and APIA Vote Post-2000].
106. See Kim Geron & James S. Lai, Beyond Symbolic Representation: A Comparison of
the Electoral Pathways and Policy Priorities of Asian American and Latino Elected Officials, 9
ASIAN LJ. 41,48-49 (2002).
107. DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND
MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 99-124 (1997). For a summary of the political science
work on this issue, see Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race: Quiet Revolution in the South,
108 HARv. L. REv. 1359 (1995).
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general rule that the majority of White voters do not vote for minority
candidates."08
TheVRA presents courts with many difficult questions. First, it con-
tains a complex scheme of remedies. Second, while the Court stated in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach'0 9 that the VRA was about "rid[ding] the
country of racial discrimination in voting: '" the mechanics of how to
attain such a purpose have proven difficult. Fundamentally, the VRA asks
the Court to step into the political process when, in the "totality of the
circumstances,"'1 1 minority representation has fallen short and to deter-
mine whether race inappropriately influenced White voters.
Not surprisingly, litigation under the VRA has been fierce. The
Court has resolved issues piecemeal and passed on the difficult questions
of how racial minorities can achieve fair representation."' justice Thomas
argued in Holder v. Hall that these difficult questions are clearly beyond
the institutional role of the Supreme Court."3 The Court's failure to ar-
ticulate a broader vision means that it has adopted a diversity of
approaches to minority representation and has left this area confused and
muddled.
The Court incorporates into the voting rights area the simplistic
analysis of race relations that it adopted in the affirmative action cases."1
4
The strongest and clearest example of this incorporation is evinced in
Shaw v. Reno, where the Court scrutinized North Carolina's 1990 reap-
108. According to the Lublin study, the maximum White vote that a minority can
expect, on the average, is around 20%. LUBLIN, supra note 107, at 45-48. But see Scott L.
Malcomson, An Appeal Beyond Race, N.Y TiMEs, Aug. 1, 2004, at D5 (noting that United
States Senator Barack Obama is a Black representative that has been able to garner some
White crossover vote).
109. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
110. Id. at 315.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2003);Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46-5i (1986) (es-
tablishing how the Court would apply the "totality of the circumstances" test in minority
challenges to Section Two of the VRA).
112. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See generally Heather K. Gerken,
Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HAsv. L. RLa. 1663, 1666-67 (2001) (ex-
plaining the problems with litigation under the VRA).
113. 512 U.S. 874,892-93 (1993) (ThomasJ., concurring).Justice Thomas said:
[W]e have immersed the federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing
questions of political theory.... In doing so, we have collaborated in what
may aptly be termed the racial "balkaniz[ation]" of the Nation.... I can no
longer adhere to a reading of the Act ... that has produced such a disastrous
misadventure in judicial policymaking.
Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
114. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MIcH. L.
Rv. 483,500 (1993).
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portionment plan and required that redistricting incorporate colorblind
principles. " ' The Court stated that:
A ... plan that includes in one district individuals who belong
to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little
in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears
an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It rein-
forces the perception that members of the same racial group-
regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live-think alike, share the same
political interest, and will prefer the same candidates. We have
rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial
stereotypes. " '
With Shaw v. Reno and subsequent cases," 7 the Court established
that race-consciousness in drawing district lines is constitutionally suspect.
The Court found that when race was a "predominant factor" in drawing
district lines, then those district lines "subordinat[ed] traditional [race-
neutral] districting principles to race."' 5 The Court requires "strict scru-
tiny for districting plans 'predominantly motivated' by race" '19 and will
find them unconstitutional unless the state demonstrates that its use of
race was "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.""12 Non-
racial motivations, which may include raw party politics to protect an in-
cumbent, political gerrymandering to maximize the chances of political
success of the current majority party, or the maintenance of geographical
boundaries and neighborhoods, are permissible bases on which to draw
districts. 2 ' Like in the affirmative action cases, it is a constitutional wrong
for state actors to project onto racial minorities political attributes merely
based on the color of their skin. 22 Political decision-making may be about
115. 509 U.S. 630, 646-51 (1993).
116. Id. at 647.
117. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (holding that there could be no
challenge to majority minority districting because politics had been the dominant factor);
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion) (striking down majority minority
districting); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (same); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995) (striking down a majority minority district and finding that race was the control-
ling rationale for the drawing of the district).
118. Bush, 517 U.S. at 979 (plurality opinion); see also Abrams v.Johnson, 521 U.S. 74,
85 (1997); Miller, 515 U.S. at 919.
119. Miller, 515 U.S. at 945.
120. Id. at 904 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995);
other citations omitted).
121. See id.
122. Cf Bush, 517 U.S. at 980 (plurality opinion) (expressing that districting that
conveys the message that race can be equated to political identity is impressible).
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power, but at least such decision-making avoids the constitutional harm of
being race conscious.
The constitutional rule that race cannot be the predominant factor
when drawing district lines has been harshly criticized."3 It seems to force
a view that when politicians use race as a basis for drawing district lines,
there is a high-level constitutional harm because politicians are implicitly
using racial stereotypes or attributing ideological beliefs to a racial minor-
ity group. The harm is what Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi have
called an "expressive harm," "one that results from the idea or attitudes
expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tan-
gible or material consequences the action brings about."1 '4 But African
Americans vote predictably as a political group favoring Democratic can-
didates. For example, in the recent California gubernatorial recall vote,
79% of African Americans voted for Democratic Lieutenant Governor
Cruz Bustamante, while only 40% of Asian Americans and 60% of Latinos
favored the Democratic candidate (in spite of Bustamante being "one of
their own"). 2 In the south, the Democratic party is now so dependent
on African American voters as their base that a recent statistical study by
Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley concludes:
[W]hile it used to be true that Democrats had a better than 50
percent chance of winning even those districts where there
was minimal [B]lack voting strength, by 1992, it was only in
southern districts with more than 10 percent [Bilack popula-
tion that Democrats were able to win more than half of the
seats; and in 1994, it was only in districts with more than 30
percent [B]lack population that Democrats could be sure of
winning more than half of the seats.'26
Grofinan and Handley document a trend that has been made in-
creasingly stark in recent elections. In the south, White voters are
123. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have to Be Liberal to Hate Racial
Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN5. L. REv. 779 (1998); Melissa Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw:
The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting, 109 YALE L.J. 1603 (2000).
124. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 114, at 506-07.
125. See Keith Aoki, Steven Bender & Sylvia R. Lazos, Race and the California Recall:
A Top Ten List of Ironies, BERKELEY LA RAZA LJ. (forthcoming 2005).
126. Bernard Grofinan & Lisa Handley, 1990's Issues in Voting Rights, 65 Miss. L.J
205, 267-68 (1995); see Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofinan, The Impact of the Voting Rights
Act on Minority Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and Congres-
sional Delegations, in Quws REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, 1965-1990, supra note 103, at 335, 337, 343; see also DAvID LUBLIN, THE PEPUBLICAN
SoUn: DEMOCRsATIZATION AND PARTISAN CHANGE (2004) (studying why the opening up of
the political process in the south through theVRA has led to dominance by the Repubh-
can Party).
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increasingly abandoning the Democratic party,"' but African Americans
remain loyal Democratic voters. In order for political party bosses,
whether Republican or Democrat, to continue to draw district lines in
ways that will favor their party, they must be race conscious. However, per
Shaw v. Reno, if it can be shown that race, rather than politics, was the pre-
dominant factor in drawing district lines, a constitutional wrong exists." 8
Many commentators have argued that the Shaw v. Reno cause of ac-
tion seems to shut the Court's eyes to the reality that, at least in the case of
African Americans, racial identity and political identity are closely related
and difficult to distinguish.129 In a 2004 poll, 63% of African Americans
identified as Democrats. 3 A "neutral," non-racial reason for such voting
behavior is that African Americans are voting in their self interest. In gen-
eral, African Americans support programs like affirmative action, 131 which
has consistently been supported by the Democratic party. Affirmative ac-
tion, although not an end-all solution to past and ongoing discrimination,
has been a significant avenue for African Americans to gain entry into the
middle class, although they are still more vulnerable than Whites to eco-
nomic slumps. 3 In addition, recent polls show that African Americans
report being economically worse off than their White counterparts,'33
which might lead African Americans, feeling economically insecure, to sup-
port governmental interventions that support the economically
disadvantaged. Thus political behavior can coincide with racial identity.
127. See Bob Moser, Endangered Species of the American South, NATION, Oct. 2, 2003,
available at http://w-ww.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20031020&c=1&s=moser (last vis-
ited Feb. 26,2005).
128. See 509 U.S. 630,649 (1993).
129. See, e.g.,Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics: Senate Districts, Minority Vote Dilu-
tion and the Preservation of the Second Reconstruction, 25 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 277, 326
(1998):
The Republican Party, for instance, has few Blacks.Thus, to a draw a Repub-
lican district is essentially to draw a White district. Under the Court's
reasoning, however, this outcome does not matter as long as the legislature is
stealthy enough not to state it is acting with the intent of creating a White
district. Of course, the legislature need not profess this aim because its in-
tended result will follow from the partisan *gerrymander anyway. Thus, the
difference between a partisan gerrymander and a racial gerrymander in this
context is in name only. And, unlike coincidental racial disproportions in, for
example, the level of prosecutions for a particular crime that has a higher rate
of commission by a certain minority group, district line drawers affirmatively
ex,-.oit racial disproportions in voting to achieve their legislative objective-
a partisan gerrymander.
130. See BoSITIS, supra note 24.
131. See THE GALLUP POLL Soc.AuDIT, supra note 23.
132. See Louis Uchitelle, Blacks Lose BetterJobs FasterAs Middle-Class Work Drops, N.Y
TIMES,July 12, 2003, at Al.
133. The Gallup Poll Social Audit, supra note 1.
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The Shaw v. Reno rule has negatively impacted the already anemic
minority representation in Congress and state legislatures. Following the
1990 census, the number of Congressional districts in which African
Americans were a majority almost doubled from seventeen to thirty-two.34
The Court, however, soon invalidated three such districts and in doing so
used harsh language to describe the districts as a result of "political apart-
heid" and "racial gerrymandering." ' 5 In addition, this constitutional rule
limits minority voters from using whatever leverage they may have in state
houses to draw district lines that might increase minority voting power.
Finally, such a rule breeds confusion. The Court's promise in Reynolds v.
Sims to provide meaningfil minority representation'- means little when
overeagerness in ensuring racial minority representation will fail to meet
constitutional standards.
In Georgia v. Ashcroft,' 37 the Supreme Court took on a preclearance
dispute under Section Five of the VRA ("Section Five") . 3 Under Section
Five, covered jurisdictions, like the State of Georgia, must obtain preclear-
ance from the United States Department of Justice when any change in
election law might have a "discriminatory effect or purpose."13 The issue
raised in Georgia v. Ashcroft was whether the new Georgia redistricting
plan might be retrogressive with respect to minority voters, either in in-
tent or effect. 4 In other words, the Court wanted to know if the
redistricting plan drawn up by a Democratic state legislature would have a
discriminatory effect on minority voters. As interpreted by other courts,
the non-retrogression principle required that decennial redistricting plans
not greatly decrease minority representation from prior levels. '41 Georgia's
proposed plan maintained the number of districts with majority African
American populations at thirteen, but it reduced the number of districts
with more than a 60% African American voting age population by five.
142
The lower court refused to preemptively clear the state senate plan and
134. See LUBLN, supra note 126, at 22-23.
135. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,647 (1993).
136. 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) ("Full and effective participation by all citizens in state
government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the
election of members of his state legislature.").
137. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). For an excellent discussion of the impact of this case on
the VRA, see Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3
ELECTION L.J. 21 (2004).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2003).
139. Id.
140. 539 U.S. at 466.
141. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (requiring pre-
clearance even when change did not dilute minority voting strength).
142. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 470-71.
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ruled that the State of Georgia had not met its burden of showing that
the new district plan did not have a retrogressive effect.143
Georgia v. Ashcroft brings to the fore many difficult questions, which
Justice O'Connor recognizes in the majority opinion. Should the Court's
retrogression analysis be concerned with guaranteeing a floor in the num-
ber of minority representatives that are electable? Should the Court
include in its calculus the possibility that there might be a cross-racial
coalition of voters that could potentially elect a minority representative?"'
In order to ensure "meaningful representation," is it more important for
minority voters to ensure that the party of their choice is a majority party
in the legislature or that a minority representative be elected?14 Although
it posits these questions, the majority opinion leaves them unanswered,
instead trusting that local legislative bodies will appropriately and consti-
tutionally146 make these tradeoffs and choices.
The Court's statement that "Section 5 leaves room for States to use
these types of... choices" '' 7 as to how African American interests may
best be represented electorally masks the Court's shifted focus in retro-
gression challenges. True, the Court has never engaged the issue as to
what type of political representation might best ensure that African
Americans' interests-whether they be identity, group, or political inter-
ests-be incorporated into the American political process. But leaving this
question open allows Justice O'Connor to skirt the difficult question of
whether backsliding in the anemic gains made by minorities in electing
their candidates of choice undermines the goals of the VRA and case law
since Reynolds v. Sims: to ensure that there is a critical mass of minority
representation so that minority voices can be heard in the political proc-
ess.
Justice O'Connor seems to be taking a reasonable judicial position
when she argues for more flexible standards under Section Five. The
Court applies a new retrogression standard in Georgia v. Ashcroft, that "a
court should not focus solely on the comparative ability of a minority
143. Id. at 471 (stating that the African American voting age population dropped in
the three state senate districts in question from 61% to 50%, 55% to 51%, and 62 percent
to 51%).
144. The legal standard under Section-Two requires only that a minority group be
able to elect "representatives of [its] choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The court observed, how-
ever, that Section Five and Secton Two serve different purposes. Ashcrofi, 539 U.S. at 478.
145. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 481 ("[S]preading out minority voters over a greater num-
ber of districts creates more districts in which minority voters may have the opportunity
to elect a candidate of their choice.").
146. The State of Georgia had argued that the redistricting plan allowed African
Americans to "effective[ly] exercise ... the electoral franchise." Id. at 479.
147. Id. at 480 ("Section 5 does not [require] ... one ... methodfl ... over another.
... [Each] option ... present[s] ... its own array of risks and benefits and presents hard
choices") (quotations and citations omitted).
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group to elect a candidate of its choice."4 Rather, it is sufficient that mi-
nority voters may have the ability (in Ashcroft, per certain analysts'
calculations, a fifty-fifty chance) to elect the candidate of their choice.
149
This shift in Section Five standards from prior case law under which any
erosion in electability or even potential electability of minority candidates
was actionable means that minority representation in state and national
legislatures, already miniscule, will be further diluted.
In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court was willing to move to a more flexi-
ble analysis in retrogression. Black voters could be "unpack[ed] ... to
increase [B]lacks' effective exercise of the electoral franchise in more dis-
tricts ... even if it means that in some districts minority voters will face a
somewhat reduced opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice "1 0
Greater deference to the judgment of the state political leadership was
appropriate in this case, because the court was persuaded that minority
voters had the potential to "play a substantial or decisive role in the elec-
toral process.'5 The Court's willingness to be more flexible and exercise
less scrutiny of the political leadership dilutes the litigation remedy under
Section Five that has done so much to increase minority representation.
In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court does begin a more nuanced discus-
sion of whether minority interests are furthered by what some call
"substantive representation," the ability of minority voters to have the
party of their choice as the majority party,52 versus "descriptive represen-
tation," the ability of a minority group to have minority representatives
elected. 1 3 The Court leaves to state politicians the discretion to weigh
these competing goals, stating: "the State's choice ultimately may rest on a
political choice of whether a substantive or descriptive representation is
preferable."'5 4 But there is much more complexity to these issues than the
Court addresses in its terse passages. The lack of full discussion regarding
the tradeoffs involved for minority voters between these two very differ-
ent types of representation allows the Court to avoid grappling with
difficult race relations issues. Should the Court trust the political process,
Democrats, or Republicans to make the key decisions that will directly
impact whether minorities will gain effective representation? Ironically,
148. Id,
149. See id.
150. Id. at 488-90 (quotations and citations omitted) (citing political science studies
that show that there has been a tradeoff between minority substantive representation (get-
ting a political agenda passed) and descriptive representation (actual number of minority
representatives)).
151. Id. at 488.
152. Id. at 488-90.
153. For a breakdown of the various concepts of representation, see HANNA FENICHaL
PrrKiN, THE CONCEPT OP REPRESENTATION (1967). Note that the Voting Rights Act only
mandates that minority groups be able to elect a representative of "their choice,' not that
minorities be able to elect minority representatives.
154. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 483.
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the raison d'etre of Section Five retrogression is that the United States
Congress did not trust the state political process to desist from manipulat-
ing structures and practices in order to exclude minorities from the
political process 5
The hopes for greater minority influence under the new Georgia
plan were not borne out in elections after 2000. The new Georgia redis-
tricting, although a nominal triumph for the Democrats, increased neither
descriptive nor substantive African American representation. After the
2000 elections, African American descriptive representation decreased, and
the preferred party of African American voters, the Democrats, found
themselves in the minority."' Greater deference to state legislatures'
judgment did not in fact result in the hoped for goal of" [B]lack voters ...
play[ing] a substantial or decisive role in the electoral process.""17
Racial dynamics in the electoral process are very complex.' 8 Ad-
dressing a highly intractable problem by giving greater leeway to
politicians without a theory as to why such deference may be warranted
is a retreat. Courts may want to avoid areas in which it is difficult to fash-
ion doctrine, but this retreat to the sidelines also means that the law might
now allow for schemes that undercut or sacrifice minority representation.
The irony is that the Court has shifted to a more deferential stance when
it is clear that minority representation in legislatures remains anemic.
C. You Gotta Have a Theory of Why Race Matters
Appearances are important. In the affirmative action cases, the blatant
use of race-conscious decision-making violates constitutional principles
because the Court views equal protection as an individual right.' 9 Judging
an individual on the basis of racial attributes is a derogation of personal
dignity and jeopardizes the fundamental liberty principles on which a free
democratic society is founded. 6
155. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 (1980) ("Congress found
that racial discrimination in voting was an insiduous and pervasive evil which had been
perpetuated in certain parts of the country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of
the Constitution.").
156. Karlan, supra note 137, at 30-43.
157. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 485-86.
158. For further discussion of this complex subject, see LAni GUINIER, THE TVRANNY
OF THE MAJORITy: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); CAROL
SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS (1995); Bernard Grofinan et al., Drawing Effective
Minority Districts:A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1383
(2001); Rick Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War with ItseJ? Sodal Science and Voting
Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1517 (2002).
159. See supra note 55.
160. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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In voting rights cases after Shaw v. Reno, the Court has found that
drawing race-conscious districts is a perpetuation of racial stereotypes,
whereby state actors assume that members of a racial minority will vote a
certain way merely because of the color of their skin.' 6' The Court ig-
nores the high correlation between political ideology and racial identity
and the commonality of lived experiences and economic circumstances
for members of many racial groups. In addition, these voting rights cases
permit courts to declare laws unconstitutional in the absence of evidence
that these actions subject any identifiable class to harm.
This jurisprudence ignores complex racial and class realities. With-
out, acknowledging the depth of existing disagreement and difference that
is part of race relations, any attempts to outline what is or is not permissi-
ble based on a superficial measure like race-consciousness are superficial
and ineffective.
II. Do COURTS THAT "LOOK LIKE AMERICA" CREATE
AN INCLUSIVE RULE OF LAW?
Let us assume for a moment that minority judges, because of their
racial experiences, can help work through some of the racial complexities
that modern equal protection doctrine poses. If it is important that the
judiciary should think and "look like America" how close are we to that
goal? Part II.A provides a summary of political science quantitative re-
search which finds that minority representation on the bench is paltry and
likely will remain so. Part II.B discusses the work of judicial behavioralist
research, which is inconclusive as to whether minority judges are more
capable of resolving race relations issues.
A. Descriptive Representation: "Mhere, Oh Where"
Are the Judges of Color?
Both the federal and state benches are overwhelmingly filled with
White males.162 Professor Barbara Graham's study finds that in 2001,
judges of color made up only 8.2% of the 30,059 available state judge-
ships. 163 African Americans represent 4.4% of state court benches,
Latinas/os 3.0%, and Asian Pacific Islander Americans ("APIA") only
161. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
162. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The demographics of
these judges are startingly similar, with the vast majority of the federal bench being
[W]hite, Protestant, male, pohtically active, middle-aged, [and] middle- to upper-
income .... ).
163. See Barbara L. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American
Courts, 10 M1cH.J. RACE & L. 153,172,184 tbl.2 (2004).
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0.6%."' In certain states, the disparities are even more disturbing. For ex-
ample, in Nevada, where Latina/os now represent 16.7% of the voting age
population, the representation of Latina/os on the bench is only 2.7%.16s
The representation of minorities on the federal bench is only slightly bet-
ter, representing about 12% of Nevadan judges.
166
At the federal level, the appointment process exacerbates the under-
representation ofjudges of color. Specifically, Republican and Democratic
presidents pursue different agendas when selecting judicial candidates.
Since Richard Nixon, Republican presidents have appointed judges
whose political views and judicial interpretive mindsets comported with
the political values held by the Republican party.167 President George W
Bush has stated that he seeks to appoint judges who are "strict construc-
tionists."'' 5 Democratic Presidents Carter and Clinton appointed judges
who, in President Clinton's words, "look like America.' ' 69 In his first term
in office, more than half of President Clinton's judicial nominees were mi-
norities or women.7 ' Unfortunately, his attempt to diversify the bench was
dampened by Republican senators who were able to block and stall his ju-
dicial appointments. 7' Notably, the most delayed of President Clinton's
nominations were women and minorities."12 In fact, at the conclusion of
President Clinton's term, the Senate Judiciary Committee had not re-
ported on fifty-seven of Clinton's nominees, most of whom were women
164. Id.
165. Id. at 190 tbl.5.
166. Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on State and Fed-
eral Appellate Benches, 1985 and 1999, 85 JuDIcATuRE 84, 90 (2001). African Americans
represent 6%, Latinas/os approximately 5%, and APIAs less than 1% of judges on the fed-
eral appellate bench. Id.
167. Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics of
Lower Federal Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 695, 698 n.11 (2003)
[hereinafter Goldman, Unpicking Pickering] (discussing research that showed that White
House staff recommended to President Nixon that he "influence the course of national
affairs for a quarter of a century after he leaves" through his judicial appointments); Dawn
Johnsen, Tipping the Scale: President Bush Picks Judges Based on Ideology-So Why Shouldn't
Senators Reject Them for It?, WASH. MoNTHLy,July/Aug. 2002, at 15.
168. Johnsen, supra note 167, at 16.
169. MICHAELJ. GERHARDT, ]IlIE FEDERAL APPOINTMENwS PROCESS 131 (2000).
170. Sheldon Goldman et al., Make-up of the Federal Bench, 84 JUDICATURE 253 (2002);
Rorie L. Spill & Kathleen A. Bratton, Clinton and Diversification of the Federal Judiciary, 84
JUDIcATuRE 256, 256-61 (2002) [hereinafter Spill & Bratton, Clinton and Diversification].
171. Goldman, Unpicking Pickering, supra note 167, at 707-17 (discussing tactics and
reporting that the highest amount of delay according to the "index of obstruction and
delay" occurred during President Clinton's administration, at the beginning of the 104th
Congress); see Maria Echaveste, Brown to Black: The Politics of Judicial Appointments for Lati-
nos, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 39, 40-42 (2003) (recounting the travails of the White
House in dealing with the Senate in attempting to get minority judicial nominees out of
comnuittee).
172. Goldman, Unpicking Pickering, supra note 167, at 712-15; see also Echaveste, supra
note 171, at 40-42 (providing anecdotal detail of the costs to individuals).
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and minorities.' With the change of Presidents, these nominations lapsed,
providing President George W Bush the opportunity to fill the vacancies
already open as well as those occurring in his terms with a Republican-
controlled Senate willing to approve the nominations. T' These vacancies
gave President Bush a significant opportunity to influence the federal bench
shortly after taking office. 7 ' Unfortunately for advocates of diversity, Presi-
dent Bush has been less likely to appoint African Americans or Latina/os
than any of his predecessors'76 and has selected candidates who are ideo-
logically conservative.'77
A key factor affecting why state benches remain mostly White and
male may be because most states' judges are elected.'78 Jarvis Hall's study
of recent judicial elections in North Carolina shows that African
American judicial candidates are not able to raise campaign funds at the
same levels as their White counterparts, which significantly impacts their
competitiveness. 71 This phenomenon parallels one documented in state
and congressional legislative races, where one of the reasons that minority
candidates have difficulty competing is that they must draw their
campaign funds from communities that are not as affluent as the majority
White community.85 As judicial races become more expensive, the
campaign fundraising gap will widen even more. In some states, it is now
estimated that it takes close to one million dollars to be competitive in a
judicial election race for the state supreme court. 8'
Many factors are at work when the public goes to the polls to elect
their judges. For example, name recognition and political party affiliation
173. Goldman, Unpicking Pickering, supra note 167, at 712-15.
174. Goldman et al., supra note 170, at 253.
175. According to then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez, "President Bush
has responded to the vacancy crisis by nominating a record number of federal judges: 90
since taking office, almost double the nominations that any of the past six presidents sub-
mitted in the first year."Alberto Gonzalez, Editorial, WML ST.J., Jan. 25, 2002, at A18.
176. Spill & Bratton, Clinton and Diversification, supra note 170, at 258-61; Rorie L.
Spill & Kathleen A. Bratton, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Presidential Patterns and
Existing Diversity (Paper presented at the Brennan Center Symposium on Diversity, Impar-
tiality, and Representation on the Bench, Feb. 20-21, 2004).
177. Susan B. Haire et al., The Voting Behavior of Clinton's Courts of Appeals Appointees,
84 JuDIcAnuRs 274, 281 (2001) (finding that Clinton appointees were "moderate," putting
George W Bush in a strong position to significantly add to the ranks of conservative fed-
eral judges selected during the Reagan-Bush era).
178. Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench:
Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985); see Graham, supra note 163, at 178-
79.
179. Jarvis Hall, Where Do We Go From Here Now: Civil Rights and the Passage of the
North Carolina Judicial Reform Act of 2002 (Paper presented at the Brennan Center Sympo-
sium on Diversity, Impartiality, and Representation on the Bench, February 20-21, 2004).
180. See generally Overton, supra note 38, at 1024-25.
181. See Hall, supra note 179, at 8.
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are influential. 182 Some voters may be influenced by stereotyping or may
not be able to imagine a person of color in the role of respectable and
esteemed jurist. 8 3 Mark Hurwitz and Drew Lanier's research suggests that
backlash may be at work as well, because when voters perceive a state
court as too liberal, they are more likely to vote for White judges than for
African American judges.1
84
In those states where governors appoint judges to the bench, a dif-
ferent dynamic may be at work. When there are no women or minorities
on the bench, governors are likely to appoint a woman or minority
judge."' Once a woman or minority judge is on the bench, the chances
that another woman or minority will be added decrease greatly. ' These
realities indicate that a governor may receive a political or symbolic bene-
fit from appearing to support diversity values by making initial
appointments of racial minorities. Once that political benefit has been
derived, there is less psychological and political pressure on a governor to
increase diversity further. Moreover, after that first "token" appointment,
an executive may be more cautious of alienating White voters by naming
more than one minority judge to the bench.""
B. Substantive Representation: /hat Does Race
Got to Do with Judging?
Judicial behavioralism is the branch of political science that applies
empirical methods to determine if there is a relationship between
personal attributes (such as race, gender, education, or experience) and
182. Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew N. Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential
Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate Courts, 3 ST.
POL. & POL'Y Q. 329, 346 (2003) [hereinafter Hurwitz & Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diver-
sity].
183. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
184- See Hurwitz & Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity, supra note 182, at 345-46.
185. In fact, the existence of diversity on the bench is one of the strongest predictors
of whether there will be additional judicial diversity. See Spill & Bratton, Clinton and Diver-
sification, supra note 170, at 256-58.
186. Id.
187. Tipping is a form of White backlash.The phenomenon of tipping has been widely
studied in the housing context. For its application in the voting context, see Pamela S. Karlan,
Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VA~n. L. REV. 291, 312-13
(1997) (characterizing African American influence in voting districts as "curvilinear,' because
as African American representation grows above 30%, Whites resent Black influence and
exhibit backlash voting patterns); Sylvia R. LazosVargasJudicial Review of Initiatives and Refer-
endums in which Majorities Vote on Minorities' Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 399,462-
73 (1999) (discussing White backlash in the context of initiatives and referenda and
describing White backlash as the desire of Whites, as the majority group, to have their
cultural values dominate).
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political affiliation of judges and their rulings. 8 ' To quote a recent
assessment of behavioralist research, these studies "demonstrat[e] ... that
ideological and political considerations drive decision-making" by
judges.'88
Of all personal attributes, political ideology seems to be the most in-
fluential attribute in predicting a judge's decisions. 190 For example, a study
on judicial sentencing shows that a significant factor in predicting
whether judges would strictly-adhere to sentencing guidelines is the po-
litical party of the president that appointed that judge to the bench.191 A
study of labor cases showed that prior experience representing manage-
ment and graduation from an elite college were significant factors in
predicting whether a judge would rule in favor of management.192Yet an-
other empirical study found that judges who were former law professors
188. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, Mhat's Law Got To Do With It?Judicial Behavioralists
Test The "Legal Model" OfJudicial Decision Making, 26 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 465, 466 (2001).
The scholars most associated with this school of thought, also termed the "attitudinal
model," are Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth. See JEFFREY A. SECAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); Harold J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A.
SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SU-
'RFME COURT (1999).
189. See Gillman, supra note 188, at 466.
190. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior ofJudges Appointed by President
Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298, 300 (1993) (finding significant party-related voting differences in
areas of criminal justice, civil rights and liberties, and labor and economic relations);Tracey
E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1635, 1651-53 (1998) (finding a significant link between party affiliation and case
outcomes); Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action
and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 164,169-71 (1983)
(finding significant party-related voting differences in criminal cases and sex and race dis-
crimination cases);Jon Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the US. Courts of Appeals: The
Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48, 51-54 (1986) (finding significant
party-related voting differences in civil rights and civil liberties cases); Gerard S. Gryski &
Eleanor C. Main, Social Backgrounds as Predictors of Votes on State Courts of Last Resort: The
Case of Sex Discrimination, 39 W. POL. Q. 528, 534 (1986) (finding significant party-related
voting differences on sex discrimination cases); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regula-
tion, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717, 1719 (1997) (finding significant
party-related voting differences); Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and
Region on Voting Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals 1955-1986, 43 W POL. Q.
317 (1990) (finding significant party-related voting differences on cases involving labor
relations, criminal law, First Amendment, and civil rights issues). But see Orley Ashenfelter
et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995) (concluding that there is no difference between Republican
judges and Democrat judges in their treatment of civil rights cases, based on a statistical
analysis of 2258 district court cases).
191. See Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on theJudicial Mind:An Empirical
Study ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1388 (1998) (citations omitted).
192. See James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the
Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 1675, 1680-81 (1999).
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were more consistent in their rulings (whether conservative or liberal)
and more forceful in making ideological points in their decisions.193
Interestingly, empirical works comparing female judges and minor-
ity judges to their gender and race counterparts do not always support the
hypothesis that a female or racial minority on the bench would lead to
outcomes that are more favorable to the interests of women or minori-
ties.19' A recent study of minority and female district court judges by
Jennifer Segal found few differences between minorities and women and
their counterparts on issues involving civil rights, criminal rights, eco-
nomic regulations, and economic liberties.19 In testing for judicial
outcome differences, Segal attempted to eliminate any possible effect of
ideology and tested by comparing only judges that had been appointed by
President Clinton.
96
Other studies, however, indicate that gender and minority
status do have an impact on judging. The most significant and
well-cited is Professor Nancy Crowe's study of federal appellate
court non-unanimous panels, in which she found that gender and
race did correlate with judicial voting behavior in employment
discrimination cases.' 97 Crowe found that party affiliation, race, and gender
significantly influenced whether plaintiffs prevailed in such cases. White
female judges were more likely than White male judges to rule for the
plaintiff in gender discrimination cases' 98 but not in race discrimination
193. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARiz. L. REv. 10, 49 (2001) [hereinafter
George, Court Fixing].
194. See David W Allen & Diane E. Wall, The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court
justices:Are They Tokens or Outsiders?, 12 Jusr. Sys.J. 232, 239 (1987) (examining the behavior
of five female state supreme court judges and identifying four of the five as much more lib-
era] than their male counterparts);John Gruhl et al., Women As Policymakers:The Case of Trial
Judges, 25 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 308, 308 (1981) (concluding, based on an analysis of one city's
criminal courts, that women judges generally did not convict and sentence defendants differ-
ently than men judges did, except that women were more likely than men to sentence
female defendants to prison time); Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Fed-
eral Bench: Clinton's District Court Appointees 53 POL. REs. Q. 137, 147 (2000) (finding no
difference between male and female judges appointed by Clinton).
195. See Segal, supra note 194, at 146-47.
196. Id. at 137-38.
197. See Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision
Making on the United States Court of Appeals, 1981-1996 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author). Professor Crowe examined race and
sex discrimination cases decided by the United States Courts of Appeals between 1981 and
1996.
198. In sex discrimination cases, Professor Crowe found that White male judges would
find for plaintiff 28% if they were Republican and 76% if they were Democrat. Theresa M.
Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New Millennium, 36 U.C.
DAvis L. Rev. 597, 604-05 (2003) (summarizing Professor Crowe's study). Female judges
would find for plaintiffi 53% if they were Republican and 90% if they were Democrat. Id.
Black judges would find for plaintiffs 61% if they were Republican and 93% if they were
Democrat. Id.
FALL 20041
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
cases. 99 Moreover, female judges were twice as likely to find for a gender
discrimination plaintiff than were White male judges if Republican-
appointed, and 14% more likely if Democrat-appointed." African Ameri-
can male judges, in both race and gender discrimination cases, found
much more often in favor of the plaintiff.2 1 Crowe's choice of sampling
method---selecting non-unanimous panels--suggests that where the facts
and the law make for close cases, judges have an opportunity to insert
their own identity experiences into the decision-making process.
These findings by Crowe were confirmed in a recent study by
Jennifer Peresie. 20 2 She found that federal female judges were more likely to
find for the plaintiff in gender discrimination cases but not likely to rule for
the plaintiff in race discrimination cases.2"3 David Allen and Diane Wall also
found that female state supreme court justices were more likely to support
plaintiffs in sexual harassment and gender discrimination cases than were
male judges. °"
Delineating areas where identity might impact judicial decision-
making is key to detecting behavioral differences. A study by Donald
Songer and Kelley Crews-Meyer found that women on state supreme
courts were less likely to apply the death penalty than their male col-
leagues,"' Another recent study of appeals court judges found that male
judges more frequently took pro-plaintiff stances in criminal procedure
and civil rights cases when a female judge was present than when one was
not. °
Although sparse, there is solid evidence that race affects judging.
Studies suggest that African American judges may be better at recognizing
discrimination, more likely to issue sentences to convicted criminal de-
fendants without being influenced by racial stereotypes, and more likely
199. In race discrimination cases, Professor Crowe found that White male judges
would find for plaintiffs 20% if they were Republican and 49% if they were Democrat. Id,
White female judges would find for plaintiffi 21% if they were Republican and 51% if
they were Democrat. Id. Black male judges would find for plaintiffs 60% if they were Re-
publican and 85% if they were Democrat. Id. at 605.
200. Id. at 604-05 (summarizing Crowe's study).
201. Id.
202. Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Dedsionmaking
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (forthcoming 2005) (studying sexual
harassment and gender- and race-based employment discrimination cases decided by fed-
eral appellate courts from 1999-2001 and concluding that female judges are much more
likely to vote liberally in sexual harassment and gender discrimination cases but not in race
discrimination cases).
203. Id. at 1769.
204. Allen & Wall, supra note 194, at 232,239.
205. Donald R. Songer & Kelley A. Crews-Meyer, Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision
Making in State Supreme Courts, 81 Soc. Sci. Q. 750 (2000).
206. Peresie, supra note 202, at 1765 (citing Tajuana Massie et al.,The Impact of Gen-
der and Race in the Decisions of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals 10-11
(Apr. 25-28,2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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to interpret sentencing guidelines less strictly. The Crowe study found that
African American male judges were more likely to find for the plaintiff in
both race and gender discrimination cases than their White male and fe-
male counterparts. °7 Two studies of African American judges in city
criminal courts that were conducted twenty years apart found that African
American judges were more likely to treat White and African American
criminal defendants "more equally" than were their White counterparts. 8
An empirical study of sentencing also found that minority judges were
more likely to deviate from the sentencing guidelines than their White
counterparts, although this difference was not statistically significant.20 9
Many researchers have interpreted these studies as being inconclu-
sive as to whether gender and race matter in judging. 10 They believe that
current studies are making only a suggestive link between race and judg-
ing for several reasons. First, the small number of women and minority
judges means that often the sample used is not large enough to achieve
statistical significance.211 Second, behavioral research does a good job of
measuring, but just what is being measured remains unclear at times. As
Professor Gillman has pointed out, behavioral research is "premised on
disputed definitions of key concepts" and claims of what attributes are
influencing outcomes "are inevitably interpretive."2"2 Finally, the strong
influence of political ideology on judging13 combined with the great
variability among minorities as to their racial perspectives,214 make it par-
ticularly difficult to untangle what impact "race" perspective as opposed
to ideology has on judging. Moreover, ideology may "drown out"
perspective effects when the rigors of quantitative analysis are brought to
bear. For example, on affirmative action, an issue that is divisive along ra-
cial, gender, and political lines,Jennifer Segal found no difference between
207. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
208. See Thomas M. UhIman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22
AM.J. PoL. Sci. 884, 889 (1978) (finding that Black judges were more likely to find defen-
dants guilty whether Black or White); Susan Welch et ai., Do BlackJudges Make A Difference,
32 AM.J. POL. ScI. 126, 133 (1998) (controlling for sentencing severity and previous incar-
ceration; and finding that Black judges were "fairer" than White judges because "[BIlack
judges are more likely than [Wihite judges to sentence [W]hite defendants to prison and
to give less severe sentences to [Bjlack defendants").
209. See Sisk et al., supra note 191, at 1457.
210. See, e.g., Beiner, supra note 198 (summarizing Segal's and Crowe's data, stating
studies are inconclusive, and falling back on anecdotes and critiques of the studies to jus-
tify why she nonetheless continues to believe that racial and gender diversity matter in
judging); George, Court Fixing, supra note 193, at 22-23.
211. See supra Part I.A (describing the dearth of minority judges).
212. See Gillman, supra note 188, at 495.
213. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
214. See Kevin R.Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the Quest
for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH.J. RACE & L. 5 (2004); Sylvia R. LazosVargas,
Can a Popular Genre Make a Serious Acadenic Contribution to Race Relations?, 18 J. LAw &
INEQ. 419 (2000).
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the decisions ofWhite and African American Clinton appointees." ' In the
area of equal protection, Jilda Aliotta concluded that Justice O'Connor's
decisions could be better explained by her political affiliation than her
gender."6
The interplay between ideology and racial perspective may be so
closely related that it will always be difficult to measure how each, on its
own, is shaping decision-making. To illustrate, Justice Thomas has consis-
tently voted against the constitutionality of governmental affirmative
action programs.217 One could argue that this is an ideologically
influenced outcome, since the other politically conservative, Republican-
appointed Justices-Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy-have also
voted consistently against government affirmative action. Nonetheless,
Justice Thomas's concurrence in Adarand' s and his dissent in Grutte?2 "9
show that his judging outcome is influenced by his racial perspective as
well. For Justice Thomas, affirmative action is constitutionally prohibited
because it racially stigmatizes minority individuals, whom society stereo-
types as inferior." By contrast, Justice Scalia believes that it is improper for
the government to address past racial discriminatory effects because Whites
should not be brought to any accounting for past racial bad acts,221 and he is
openly skeptical as to whether ongoing discrimination is so endemic and
215. See Segal, supra note 194, at 147.
216. See Jilda M. Aliotta,Justice O'Connor and the Equal Protection Clause: A Feminine
Voice?, 78 JUDIcATuRE 232 (1995).
217. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 240
(1995) (Thomas,J, concurring).
218. 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas,J, concurring).
219. 539 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).Thomas
said: "The American people have always been anxious to know what they shall do with
us.... I have had but one answer from the beginning. Do nothing with us! ... I believe
[B]lacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university
administrators." Id. at 349-50 (Thomas,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quo-
tations and citations omitted). Professor Guinier calls this perspective "each [B]lack man or
woman for himself or herself'. Guinier, supra note 74, at 182 n.266.
220. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("When [B]lacks take positions in the highest places of government, industry or
academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part in their ad-
vancement.").
221. Justice Scalia's concurrence in City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co. makes the ar-
gument that to connect past acts of racism to present acts violates the principle of
individualism. 488 U.S. 469, 520,527 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring):
In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.... [A]
racial quota derogates the human dignity and individuality... [It] is a divider
of society, a creator of castes.... [W]hen we depart from this American prin-
ciple [of racial neutrality] we play with fire, and much more than an
occasional ... Croson burns.
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systemic that any state action should attempt to redress it.12 On the issue
of racism, Justice Thomas believes racial discrimination is part of Ameri-
can society,2 3 perhaps even that racism is "hardwired" into the American
psyche as Professor Richard Delgado argues."' However, Justice Thomas
believes that government action to remedy endemic and structural racism
22-5
is futile and more harmful than beneficial. Justice Thomas reaches his
conclusions using both his racial experience2  and his belief about the
permissible role of government in social interventions under the Consti-
127tution.
In sum, instead of concluding that gender and race have no impact
on judging, it may be fairer to conclude that researchers have not yet fig-
ured out how to adequately test the hypothesis.
222. Prior to being appointed to the bench,Justice Scalia wrote in a law review arti-
cle that he did not believe that White immigrants had any responsibility for past racial
harms caused by the institutions of slavery and Jim Crow that pre-existed their arrival to
the United States. See Antonin Scalia, Commentary, The Disease as Cure: In Order to Get
Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 152.
This viewpoint reinforces the myth that racism metamorphisizes and eventually
melts away into the White ethnic identity, that it is not a serious injury or harm that can
persist through history, and that racism and racist attitudes are not entrenched in current
economic structures and social norms.This mythology also supports the view that the law
must proscribe only intentional, culpable, and episodic racism, because it is an individual
fault that can be overcome. However, such a construction of racism permits its decontex-
tualization, unlinks race from its historical roots, and limits conceptually its current social
and economic forms. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus:
The White Ethnic Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TusrLA L. RE. 1493, 1525 (1998)
[hereinafter LazosVargas, Deconstructing Homogeneous] Americanus].
223. Cf Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[R]acial paternalism ...
can be ... poisonous .... [B]enign discrimination teaches many that ... minorities cannot
compete with them without their patronizing indulgence.") (internal quotations omitted).
224. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
225. Cf Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Affirmative action]
programs engender attitudes of [White] superiority [and] ... stamp minorities with a
badge of inferiority [that] may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an atti-
tude that they are 'entided' to preferences.").
226. For a discussion of how race is reflected in Justice Thomas' jurisprudence, see
Angela Onwuachi-Wilig, just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice Clarence Thomas
Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 lowA L. Ray. (forthcoming 2005); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master's "Tool" to Dismantle His House: Why Justice Clarence
Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARiz. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005).
227, Cf Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas,J., concurring) (stating that "[glovernment
cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the
law").
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III. DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSION: A PLURALISTIC
PROCESS-BASED MODEL OF JUDGING
The lack of resolution in the empirical work as to whether descrip-
tive racial and gender diversity yields measurably different outcomes leads
back to our beginning inquiry. Is greater representation of minority judges
on the bench necessary to attain a rule of law that is inclusive? Part III.A
explains that the pluralistic process-based model of judging theorizes that
inclusion of racial experiential viewpoints on the bench can achieve an
inclusive rule of law. Part III.B explains how Grutter points the way to
achieving the pluralistic judging model. Diversity on the bench must go
beyond token appointments and instead achieve critical mass so that
courts can become pluralistic dialogic institutions. Part III.C acknowl-
edges that the presence of minority judges may not necessarily lead to
diverse dialogic environments, because individual minority judges may
choose to view their judicial role narrowly. However, a critical mass of
minority judges would likely result in a range of minority perspectives as
to the judicial role.
A. Pluralistic Judging in an Epistemologically Diverse Democracy
Part I concluded that undertheorizing race leads to doctrinal gaps
and confusion for those who must put judicial decisions into operation.
Cass Sunstein has argued that constitutional courts should avoid large-
scale theorizing and generally should make constitutional law incremen-
tally, leaving areas of high political disagreement undecided in order for
the political process to have an opportunity to work through them.
2 1
Whatever the merits of Sunstein's argument, with respect to race relations,
courts should be clear and develop fully articulated reasons as to why race
matters in the law. In societies with a great deal of racial, ethnic, and cul-
tural diversity, conflict and disagreement should be expected. Racial and
other identity-based conflicts are permanent default conditions that con-
stitutional courts should recognize as facts of life as they fashion
doctrine.229 Ongoing racial and other identity-based conflicts go beyond
honest disagreements, because individuals do not understand each other's
228. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 6-19
(1996).
229. See Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion, supra note 28, at Part I; see also JOHN
RAiWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xviii (Columbia Univ. Press 1996) (1993); id. at 36
("[D]iversity of reasonable comprehensive ... doctrines found in modern societies is not a
mere historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public
culture of democracy.").
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different experiences. Some believe these lived differences in experience
may not be fully comprehensible to others by reason or empathy.3
A pluralistic process-based model of judging responds to the chal-
lenges of judging in an epistemologically diverse society, one that is
divided because majorities and minorities have different realities born in
identity-based experiences. Under process theory, courts ensure that the
democratic process represents all members of the polity.2 31 John Hart Ely
believed that courts have a legitimate counter-majoritarian role in polic-
ing the functioning of democracy and in ensuring that the rule of law is
fashioned as "participation-oriented [and] representation-reinforcing.
'2 32
Where majorities 'and minorities do not possess equal power and status,
judges should ensure full participation and representation of all members
of the polity. A pluralistic process-based model of judging envisions that
courts will: i) get the content right of minimum substantive rights;233
ii) ensure that, in the development of constitutional doctrine, the "reali-
ties" of both majorities and minorities are included;3 4 and iii) balance the
court's role as ultimate decision-maker of inviolable rights and defer po-
litical disagreements to the political process so that majorities and
minorities have the opportunity to work out deep disagreements. 35 The
following Sections provide further detail to this model, which Democracy
and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing The Role of the Judge in a Pluralist Polity
more fully elaborates.
236
230. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84
CAL. L. REv. 61, 69-71 (1996) (describing "false empathy" wherein Whites "pretend to
understand and sympathize with a Black" and the "empathetic fallacy" as a belief that
individuals can surmount place and culture and transcend their situations). See generally
Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2099 (1989) (arguing empathy is an inexact concept and not adaptable
to principled legal inquiry).
231. JOHN HART ELY, DEMocRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77
(1980).John Hart Ely argues that judicial review is appropriate wherever the Court might
deem that there is "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities." Id.
232. Id. Professor Ely simply argued that "we came to recognize that the existing
constitutional devices for protecting minorities were simply not sufficient. No finite list of
entitlements can possibly cover all the ways majorities can tyrannize minorities, and the
informal and more formal mechanisms of pluralism cannot always be counted on either."
Id. at 105. As Ely explains, such dynamics "provid[e] the 'majority of the whole' with the
'common motive to invade the rights of other citizens' that Madison believed improbable
in pluralistic society." Id, at 153 (citations omitted).
233. See infa Part 1II.A.1.
234. See infra Part III.A.2.
235. See infra Part III.A.3.
236. This theory, explained in more detail in Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion,
supra note 28, applies John Rawls's Political Liberalism. See RAwLS, supra note 229. Rawls
posits that pluralist societies have inherent moral disagreements because of the wide array
of "comprehensive doctrines" held by individual members. Id. at 137.
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1. Getting the Content Right of Minimum Substantive Rights
Constitutional courts, as the lead constitutional decision-makers,
construct the minimum rights that each member of American society
expects to hold. In thinking of epistemologically diverse democracies,
Frank Michelman posited that a "respect-worthy" judicial process should
first ensure that, to the extent possible, courts "get it right" as to
constitutional rights. 37 We often think of these minimum rights as human
rights, the rights that should give a minimum content of individual
dignity and freedom to all individuals regardless of their status.238
Minimum rights are important, because history has shown too frequently
that majorities may use their social and economic power and privilege to
deprive minorities of basic human rights.
2.The Epistemological "Realities" of Both Majorities and Minorities
Need to Be Included in the Elaboration of the Rule of Law
"Likes" and "unlikes" must strive to construct terms of coexistence
in order for pluralistic societies to have the necessary stability and coop-
eration that will withstand ongoing and constant identity-based
ideological conflict. Discursive practice must take place in ways that are
respectful of differences and that legitimize the "realities" of all groups. 39
Ideas (or premises based on epistemologies), regardless of whether they
are held by majorities or minorities, are equally legitimate. None are ex
ante privileged." Minorities' views should not be devalued simply be-
cause they do not come from the majority that enjoys privilege, prestige,
and political power. If a constitutional court fails to engage minorities'
epistemological "truths" the court appears to be choosing arbitrarily from
among competing "truths.'
237. FRAx 1. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMocRAcY 59 (1999).
238. See ELY, supra note 231, at 105 (arguing that there is a function for basic rights);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971). These are the basic, minimum rights
that each member of society is entitled to regardless of his or her circumstance. Lazos Var-
gas, Democracy and Inclusion, supra note 28, at 230 ("[R]ights not only reinforce the
democratic process, as explained above, but also ensure substantive legitimacy and enforce
the polity's liberal values.").
239. A constitutional court's failure to include and engage minority perspectives
means that minorities are not meaningfully included in formulating the substantive values
of the polity The Court's imposition of a majority epistemological perspective on minor-
ity members can be seen as an act of oppression towards minorities. Lazos Vargas,
Democracy and Inclusion, supra note 28, at 190 (referring to RAWLS, supra note 229, at 137
n.5,225-26).
240. See id. at 207-09.
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3. Balancing the Court's Role as Ultimate Decision-Maker of Inviolable
Rights and Deferring to the Political Process
Constitutional courts have the potential to educate the polity as to
how to disagree in ways that promote cohesion in society.24" ' Courts should
assist in framing disagreements that are political and do not infringe on the
basic rights of either majorities or minorities to help the political process
work out necessary compromises.242 A pluralistic process-based model of
judging requires that courts recognize their limitations in being able to fully
resolve all difficult identity-based issues and conflicts. A court is just one of
the constitutional decision-makers. Courts can reinforce participation in the
political process by passing on divisive issues that do not involve basic
minimum rights so that they can be resolved by the political process.243 The
political process must allow enough open and equal-footing discursive
space for majorities and minorities to work out their differences.4 Ulti-
mately, in a political environment where truth is relative and where
multiple perspectives must co-exist in tension, resolution of majority-
minority confrontations, which are both ideological and based on different
versions of social truth, must be tentative and ongoing.
2 4
1
This model of judging goes beyond the usual justifications for diver-
sity on the bench. First, this model does not focus merely on the perception
that fair judging is occurring. Rather, it makes the claim that the inclusion
of minority perspectives on the bench has value in and of itselP' and goes
beyond perceived greater legitimacy."7 Inclusive judging provides a reason
for minority citizens to continue to trust key governmental institutions and
believe that they are neutral rather than political. Making a conscious (or
241. See id. at 224-38.
242. See id. at 228-29.
243. See id. at 228-32.
244. See id. at 232-34.
245. See id. at 216-19.
246. Professor Ifill makes a similar argument. She believes that good judging requires
that views from the "traditionally excluded" be part of the judicial decision-making proc-
ess. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 405, 410 (2000) ("[T]he creation of a racially diverse bench can
introduce traditionally excluded perspectives and values into judicial decision-making. The
interplay of diverse views and perspectives can enrich judicial decision-making.").
247. Legitimacy has procedural and substantive aspects. From a substantive perspective,
"exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected
to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason."
iRAwts, supra note 229, at 137. From a procedural perspective, "decisions are legitimate...
because they are enacted in accordance with an accepted legitimate democratic proce-
dure.... [T]he outcomes of a legitimate procedure are legitimate whatever they are. This
gives us purely procedural democratic legitimacy." Id. at 428. "Legitimacy is a weaker idea
than justice and imposes weaker constraints on what can be done.... [A decision] may not
be just and still be legitimate ... " Id.
FALL 2004]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
affirmative) effort to include minorities in forming the polity's values en-
sures that all members have a stake in the polity. In The Federalist No. 39,
James Madison emphasized that exclusion of significant sectors of a polity
"degrades the republican character" of popular government, because "it is
essential to a [republican] government that it be derived from the great
body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored
class of it."24 Trust that institutions can function capably and inclusively is
part of what makes it possible for democratic societies to diffuse racial and
identity-based conflicts and keep them at tolerable levels.
In a pluralistic process-based model ofjudging, judges must be able to
confront "truths" that are assumed. In other words, judges must be able to
question the assumptions of race, gender, and heterosexuality that society
has normalized. The goal is not necessarily for judges to understand or em-
pathize with the perspective of the other. Rather, the process of judging
needs to acknowledge all viewpoints of the "truth:' In their legal reasoning,
judges must account for why they have chosen one social truth' over an-
other. This mode of discourse is respectful of minority perspectives.
Consciously including minority perspectives in the judicial process
has been criticized by Professor Michelman as being so visibly fractious
that a judge appears to be a "jousting champion of its identification con-
tenders in divisions where the truth lies."249 But is it not better to make
the process of choosing or rejecting social, identity-based truths transpar-
ent, rather than manipulating facts or conveniently constructing
traditional values so that the doctrinal conclusion is precisely what the
judge's preferred 'jousting" truth is?
A second response to Professor Michelman's concern is that courts
should not necessarily take it upon themselves to resolve identity-based
disagreements unless minorities' basic rights are at stake. The burden of
working through the truly difficult questions that divide society must be
the responsibility of all democratic political institutions, not just courts.
For this reason, courts must not trump the political process by developing
constitutional rules in areas that are, at their core, perspective disagree-
ments, that is, disagreements based on different lived experiences."' If
courts were to trump the political process, they would abort any further
discussion or compromise and limit the opportunity for civic society to
learn from outsider perspectives and advance racial understanding.25 '
248. ThE FEDERAuLST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
249. Frank I. Michelman, Dilemmas of Belonging: Moral Truth, Human Rights, and Why
We Might Not Want a Representative judiciary, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1221, 1252 (2000).
250. For example, I have argued that affirmative action is, at its core, a perspective
disagreement, and for that reason the Court's constitutional rulings in Adarand and Croson,
which overturned state affirmative action programs arrived at through a process of politi-
cal compromise, were improper. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion, supra note 28, at
252-64.
251. Id. at 264-67.
[VOL. 10:10t
Diversity on the Bench
Courts as "lawgivers" must reign themselves in and provide opportunities




B. Applying Grutter v. Bollinger to the Challenge ofAchieving
a Pluralistic Process-Based Model ofJudging
A pluralistic process-based model ofjudging claims to fashion an in-
clusive rule of law, but it also places a great burden on judges. Judges
should be able to understand, and not shy away from, engaging minority
viewpoints and bringing them to bear on difficult legal issues.When racial
dynamics are at work, judges must be able to articulate why race matters
and develop a rule of law that properly takes into account racial tensions
without trumping the political process. Yet judges must also identify acts
of discrimination and racial hatred that are not worthy of civil democratic
society. While judges should stand back with respect to perspective dis-
agreements, judges must also be able to discern where minimum
substantive rights are being trespassed by the majority.
This pluralistic ethic of judging is demanding. A necessary step to
achieving a judging ethic where differing racial perspectives and realities
are part of the judging process is garnering a critical mass of minority
judges and those with an "outsider" perspective on key benches. As dis-
cussed in Part II, in spite of increasing pools of qualified minority
candidates, a diverse bench has not been achieved; in fact, the bench has
not evolved past token representation." 3
Grutter v. Bollinger acknowledges that race-conscious inclusion of indi-
vidual minorities is required to achieve viewpoint diversity.5 4 Grutter
recognizes that minorities, as a group and as individuals, contribute unique
viewpoints that should be represented in democratic institutions where
racial dialogue needs to flow freely.25 A racially diverse environment "en-
ables [students] to better understand persons of different races ... [and the]
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and inter-
esting."2 6 Grutter deferred to the University of Michigan Law School's
expert judgment that to create such a dialogic discursive environment,
252. My focus here is on the judicial role, and for that reason, I am assuming for
purposes of this discussion that the political process meaningfully represents minorities. I
recognize this is a problematic assumption, as I discussed in LazosVargas, The Latina/o and
APIA Vote Post-2000, supra note 105.
253. See supra Part II.A.
254. See 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
255. Id. at 330 (finding that diversity "policy promotes 'cross-racial understanding,'
helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables [students] to better understand persons
of different races.... '[C]lassroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting' when the students have 'the greatest possible variety of back-
grounds.' ") (citations omitted).
256. Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
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one must move beyond a handful of token minorities and instead seek a
critical mass."'
Grutter makes clear that the Constitution does not always condemn
a state decision-maker who assumes that there is an equivalence between
an individual's racial identity and viewpoint. As long as the decision-
maker scrutinizes the individual's credentials on their own merit, there is
no constitutional violation."'5 The Grutter Court deferred to administra-
tors' judgments because in achieving the goal of viewpoint diversity, it is
not possible to impose strict formulas or unbending guidelines. As Justice
O'Connor recognized, context is key in attaining the goals of equality
and diversity."'
Democratic institutions must continue to appear inclusive of all
groups.26° All members of society must believe that they have an opportu-
nity to participate in democratic institutions that determine who will have
the privilege of occupying positions of leadership and prestige. 61 To attain
diversity in society's leadership, the Grutter Court was willing to accept that
state decision-makers would use a race-conscious process to achieve a criti-
cal mass of minority students. 2 2 These beneficiaries of affirmative action
would subsequently have access to positions of leadership within the elite
institutions foundational to democratic society, such as the military.263 As
257. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
259. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 ("Context matters when reviewing race-based govern-
mental action under the Equal Protection Clause.").
260. Id. at 330-31. The Court noted: "[Miajor American businesses have made clear
that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." Id. (citing Brief
of 3M et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants Seeking Reversal at 5,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1447); Brief of General Motors
Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 3-4, Grutter (6th Cir.
2002)). It further stated: "What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of
the United States military assert that, '[b]ased on [their] decades of experience a 'highly
qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its prin-
ciple [sic] mission to provide national security."' Id. (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen.
Juhus W Becton,Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 27, Gotter (2003)).
261. Id. By acknowledging the amicus briefs from the Fortune 500 companies and the
elite military institutions, the Court nodded at the claim that neither the military nor top
American businesses could function well if they were denied the ability to choose leadership
from a pool that was racially and ethnically diverse.
262. Id. at 328-34.
263. ketired military leaders asserted that:
[A] highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's
ability to fulfill its principle [sic] mission to provide national security... [Tihe
military cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially
diverse unless the service academies and the ROTC used limited race-
conscious recruiting and admissions policies.
Id. at 330-31 (quotations and citations omitted); see also id. at 332.
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well, the Grutter Court justified race-conscious admissions because such a
method would best ensure the critical mass necessary for viewpoint diver-
sity to be consistently and reliably expressed within the educational
264context. The Grutter Court was willing to accept that state decision-
makers would sometimes make educated guesses that individual minorities
would raise the quality of the debate. 265 Grutter recognizes that there must
be some deference to an administrator who makes a judgment about what
an applicant might contribute, both to the training of minorities as would-
be leaders and to the viewpoint diversity that educators seek in the class-
room.261 Such deference meets the exacting standard of strict scrutiny267
because the ends-attaining the perception that key democratic institutions
are accessible to all regardless of their racial status and the pluralistic dialogic
environment that contributes to the education of both racial majorities and
minorities-are so important yet so difficult to achieve that courts appro-
priately defer to the good faith efforts of administrators.268
Grutter suggests that there is no exact science to achieving viewpoint
diversity. However, increasing the number of minority judges to achieve a
critical mass is a rough method for realizing viewpoint diversity. This
assertion is based on the argument that in order for a minority judge to
have reached her station in life, she must have learned many life lessons
about how race impacts minorities in the every day world. Thus, if a
judicial candidate has successfully navigated through these race-based life
experiences, she likely has formulated a theory of race relations and could
be adept at identifying when positive or negative racial dynamics may be
impacting a legal issue in a way that is not readily discernible to a
majority judge. A critical mass is necessary because what is sought is a
dialogic environment where disagreement as to racial perspective can be
freely and candidly expressed, forcing majority colleagues to consider
perspectives and realities with which they are not familiar. A token
number of minorities may not be able to muster a sustained exchange.
Individual minority judges might shy away from making their colleagues
264. Id. at 329-30.
265. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
266. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316 (finding that a policy will pass constitutional muster
when it "seeks to guide admissions officers in producing classes both diverse and academi-
cally outstanding, classes made up of students who promise to continue the tradition of
outstanding contribution by Michigan Graduates to the legal profession") (quotations and
citation omitted).
267, But Justice Kennedy argued in his dissent that such deference renders strict
scrutiny non-meaningful. Id. at 393 (KennedyJ., dissenting).
268. Id. at 326 (stating that strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, but fatal in fact")
(quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)). "Not every deci-
sion influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a
framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons ad-
vanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context."
Id. at 327.
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uncomfortable and choose to "get along" rather than educate them on
racial issues, or an individual minority judge's racial perspectives may not
be sufficiently dissimilar from the majorities' racial perspectives to spur
dialogic exchange. The key is that there be sufficient numbers of
minorities so that a wide range of views on race can be freely expressed
and colleagues will be pushed to rethink assumptions that might be based
on stereotypes or privilege.
C. Would More Minority Judges Necessarily Lead
to a Robust Racial Dialogue?
Is there any evidence, either empirical or anecdotal, that the pres-
ence of minority judges can produce an environment where racial
perspectives can be freely exchanged in the judging process? Judges are
individuals who make choices as to how they will be judges; as well, mi-
nority judges make choices as to how their racial perspectives will affcct
the judicial decision-making process. Adding more minority judges to the
bench will not always increase racial dialogue. A minority judge might
choose to remain silent on racial issues, forego confrontations with major-
ity colleagues, or be temperamentally adverse to challenging colleagues'
assumptions.
To illustrate, a corollary to the conclusion in Part I that the Court
has not developed a theoretical framework for race is that the only sitting
minority Justice on this Court, Justice Thomas, has chosen not to push
the Court-which is deeply divided and tends toward conservatism-to
go beyond simplistic understandings of race relations.Justice Thomas, who
inherited Justice Thurgood Marshall's seat on the Supreme Court, has
only intermittently been a racial conscience for the Court. 69 More fre-
quently, Justice Thomas has made clear his antipathy for judicial
intervention into the racial thicket of issues such as school desegrega-
tiony7 0 affirmative action,"' and minority voting rights."'
269. See Frank H. Wu, Taking Thomas Seriously (Paper Presented at the Brennan Cen-
ter Symposium on Diversity, Impartiality, and lepresentation on the Bench, Feb. 20-21,
2004).
270. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(asserting that "[pisychological injury or benefit is irrelevant to the question whether state
actors have engaged in intentional discrimination-the critical inquiry for ascertaining
violations of the Equal Protection Clause").
271. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349-50 (Thomas,J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
272. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,892 (1993) (Thomas,J., concurring). In his
concurrence, Thomas stated:
A review of the current state of our cases shows that by construing the [Vot-
ing Rights] Act to cover potentially dilutive electoral mechanisms, we have
immersed the federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of
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Justice Thomas speaks sparingly on racial issues, but when he does
he has great impact. In Virginia v. Black, Justice Thomas provided a rich
racial perspective that sharply contrasted to the decontextualized analyses
offered by his colleagues. "3 Justice Thomas spoke from what appeared be
his and his family's experience in the south and African Americans' fear of
Ku Klux Klan violence unchecked by the law.17 1 Justice Thomas defended
Virginia's interest in criminalizing cross burning, because "cross burning
has almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably instills in its
victims well-grounded fear of physical violence."27 In United States v. Ford-
ice,276 justice Thomas spoke again from what appeared to be his experience
of growing up in the south. He argued that there was a strong case for
maintaining traditionally Black colleges: that traditionally Black colleges
have great value because of their symbolic inspiration to African
American students, the unique educational diversity they offer, and their
function as incubators of African American culture.1
7
Justice Thomas's judging style is individualistic. As Paul Edelman and
Jim Chen have recently concluded, Justice Thomas has devoted most of
political theory--questions judges must confront to establish a benchmark
concept of an "undiluted" vote.... [W]e have collaborated in what may aptly
be termed the racial "balkanization" of the Nation.
Id. (citation omitted).
273. Compare the descriptions and allusions to cross-burning in the majority opin-
ion, 538 U.S. 343, 357 (2003) ("[Wlhile a burning cross does not inevitably convey a
message of intimidation, often the cross burner intends ... the message [ofl fear...."), id. at
361 ("[Clross burning is symbolic expression.....), id. at 365 (stating that banning cross-
burning" 'would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas' ") (citation omit-
ted), id. ("[A] burning cross is not always intended to intimidate...."), with Justice
Thomas's descriptions in his dissenting opinion, id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In
every culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can compre-
hend.... [C]ross burning is the paradigmatic example of the [profane]."), id. at 389 (stating
that cross burning is "'a tool for the intimidation and harassment of racial minorities,
Catholics, Jews, Communists, and any other groups hated by the Klan' ") (citation omit-
ted), id. at 390 (stating that to one Black woman, a "burning cross symbolized ... 'murder,
hanging, rape, lynching.Just about anything bad"') (citation omitted).
274. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 214, at 14 (characterizing Justice
Thomas' position as "unquestionably" speaking from an "African American perspective"); see
also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Bumings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the
Crits?, 93 Gio L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (analyzing Justice Thomas's impact on the rest of the
Court in its analysis of Virginia v. Black).
275. 538 U.S. at 391 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
276 505 U.S 717,745 (1992) (Thomas,J., concurring).
277. 505 U.S. at 748 (Thomas,J., concurring) ("Despite the shameful history of state-
enforced segregation, these institutions have survived and flourished .... I think it undis-
putable that these institutions have succeeded in part because of their distinctive histories
and traditions; for many, historically [Black colleges have become 'a symbol of the highest
attainments of [B]lack culture.' ").
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his intellectual energy to "scoring ideological points., 27 Challenging his
brethren to think outside their racial zone of comfort is not the role Jus-
tice Thomas sees for himself on the Supreme Court.
Justice Thomas's choices as to how to be a judge show why courts
would benefit from going beyond tokenism and pushing towards a critical
mass of minority representation. Justice Thomas has a racial perspective
and can reach his colleagues when he feels so moved. But engaging racial
issues is unusual for Thomas. He rarely speaks from the bench and de-
clines to engage his colleagues in oral arguments. Historically, dissenters
have played a crucial role as the Court's conscience, challenging conven-
tional wisdom. In the early 1900s, the first Justice Harlan played this role
in heroic dissents in Plessy v. Ferguson279 and Downes v. Bidwell. 2&0 However,
Justice Thomas, as the only African American justice, has chosen a judging
style that only occasionally challenges the Court's view on race. An addi-
tional minority judge, with a more engaged judging style, could spark a
more robust racial dialogue on the Court.
IV THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY OF INCREASING
THE NUMBER OF MINORITY JUDGES
More than individual choices, however, the reality of politics repre-
sents the greatest roadblock to the goal of increased minority representation
on the bench. Experience has shown that a commitment to diversity on the
bench triggers ugly politics. President Clinton's goal to build a more diverse
bench came at the expense of another goal: getting the maximum number
of Democratic nominees approved by the Senate and seated on the bench
before his term ended.
28'
However, the pressure of the electorate's changing demographics
might hasten the appointments of more minority judges. President
George W Bush is widely expected to name the first Latino Supreme
Court Justice with the next vacancy'8' as a way of courting the increasing
electoral clout of Latinos.283
Nevertheless, any increase in diversity on the bench through politi-
cal pressure will be limited. First, there is no reason to expect that
278. Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting
the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 MINN. L. R.y 131, 212 (2001) (concluding that Justices
Scalia and Thomas do not aim to assemble winning coalitions "and may even be willing to
sacrifice an occasional imperfect victory" to maintain ideological consistency).
279. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
280. 182 U.S. 244, 347 (1901) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
281. See supra note 169-73 and accompanying text.
282. See Kevin R. Johnson, On the Appointment of a Latinalo to the Supreme Court, 5
HARv. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2002) (published concurrently in 13 BERKELEY LA RAPZA L.J. 1
(2002)).
283. See LazosVargas, The Latina/o and APIA Vote Post-2000, supra note 105, at 794.
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executives will go beyond token appointments. The benefit of appointing
minorities and women to the bench is symbolic; it is a political signal to
the electorate of the politician's values." 4 After "firsts," politics as usual
takes over, and as Part II discussed, minorities have not yet been able to
gain a sufficient foothold in this political game.
Second, voters do not seem to focus on the political importance of a
diverse bench. A recent poll showed that the majority of Latina/o voters
remained unaware of the ongoing battle over the Miguel Estrada nomina-
tion.285 In the midst of the Senate Democratic filibuster of Estrada's
nomination, less than 20% of those polled had even heard of Miguel
Estrada, 28 6 even though President Bush tried to make this nomination a
"wedge" issue in his favor. Latina/os did not view the increased diversifi-
cation of the judiciary to be as immediate a political issue as were others
like education, health care, and the economy, 27 but 80% in one poll be-
lieved it was important for Estrada to be confirmed."8
Finally, the politics of race-conscious judicial appointments are com-
plicated and have become so entangled that there are few rewards, other
than symbolic ones, to the executive who attempts to diversify the bench.
The high profile cases of President Bush's nominees, Janice Rogers Brown
and Miguel Estrada, illustrate the challenge. Both were opposed by minor-
ity political interest groups. 8 9 In the case of Janice Rogers Brown, the
NAACP issued a thirty-nine page report entitled Loose Cannon that
accused Brown of being opposed to affirmative action and against minority
plaintiffi in employment discrimination cases.2 In an editorial, the
National Bar Association's former president, Robert L. Harris, reminded
African American attorneys that "[w]e should always remember that a
'White' Justice Stevens ... is a thousand times better for Black America
than a 'Black' justice Clarence Thomas. '" 29 The implication is that Janice
Rogers Brown would be similar to Justice Thomas on the bench and vote
against affirmative action, voting rights, and school desegregation.
In the case of Miguel Estrada, the Mexican American Legal Defense
and Educational Fund ("MALDEF"), Puerto Rican Legal Defense &
284. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
285. Bendixen & Associates, New Democrat Network Hispanic Project (2003), available at
http://bendixenandassociates.com/ppt/New/20Democrat%/ 20Networkfiles/frame.htm
(last visited Feb. 26,2005).
286. Id.
287. See id.
288. See Jennifer G. Hickey, Democrats, Hispanics at Odds Over Estrada, INSIGHT MAG.,
Jun. 13, 2001 (reporting a poll of 800 Latino adults).
289. See infra notes 290, 292-95 and accompanying text.
290. See PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY AND NAACP, LOOSE CANNON: REPORT
IN OPPOSITION TO THE CONFIRMATION OF JANICE P.OGERS BROWN TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT 9-11, 18-19 (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://
www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid = l 2531.
291. Mike McKee, Battle OverJanice Rogers Brown, RECORDER, Oct. 15,2003.
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Education Fund ("PRLDEF"), and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus
vigorously opposed his nomination.292 PRLDEF issued a sharply-worded
report disputing the administration's depiction of Estrada's rags-to-riches
immigrant story.2" Estrada, according to PRLDEF, came from a privileged
Honduran family and "lack[ed] any connection whatsoever" to the lives
of most Latina/o defendants who might come before his court."'
MALDEF opposed Estrada based on an extensive analysis of his available
legal record."9 MALDEF argued that Estrada would not support the due
process and equal protection rights of Latina/os, particularly immigrants
and youths who live in barrios and might frequently encounter police
harassment. 96
However, opposition to Estrada's nomination to the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit was not uniform among
Latina/o political interest groups. The League of United Latin American
Citizens and the National Council of La Raza supported Miguel Estrada's
nomination.
2 97
The impending battle over Estrada's nomination was cut off by his
withdrawal, as it had gotten personal and ugly. 8 His withdrawal was a
292. Tony Mauro, Nomination Splits Hispanic Legal Community, AM. LAW. MEDIA, Sept.
2002.
293. Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Position Statement on the
Nomination of Miguel A. Estrada to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (Sept. 17,2002).
294. Id. PRLDEF noted that "a number of his colleagues have said unequivocally
that Mr. Estrada has expressed extreme views that they believe to be outside the main-
stream of legal and political thought." Id. Further, Estrada has "made strong statements that
have been interpreted as hostile to criminal defendants' rights, affirmative action and
women's rights." Id. In addition, PRLDEF described Estrada in personal interviews as
"arrogant and elitist" and someone who "doesn't listen to other people." Id.
295. Patrick Leahy, Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy On the Nomination of Miguel
Estrada to the D.C. Circuit Judiciary Committee Business Meeting, Jan. 30, 2003, available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200301/013003.html (quoting from a letter from MALDEF
to the Senate Judiciary Committee and the White House; Senator Leahy concluded that
he agreed with MALDEF's dissatisfaction over Estrada's lack of full disclosure). Estrada's
refusal to provide extensive documentation on his stints in the Department ofJustice was a
principal bone of contention that the Democrats pointed to in opposing his nomination.
296. Memorandum of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(MALDEF) and SouthwestVoter Registration and Education Project (SVREP) Explaining
Bases for Latino Opposition to the Nomination of Miguel Estrada to the DC Circuit
Court of Appeals (2003), available at http://www.maldef.org/news/latest/estmemo.cfin
("We, therefore, must conclude that based on the record available, he would not fairly
review matters as a judge on issues that would have a great impact on our community. We
oppose this nomination to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.").
297. See Leahy, supra note 295. The Hispanic National Bar Association, the U.S. His-
panic Chamber of Commerce, the Hispanic Business Roundtable, and the Latino
Coalition also supported the Estrada nomination.
298. See personal comments made about Mr. Estrada by PRLDEF, supra notes 293-
94; see also CNN, Estrada Withdraws, supra note 45.
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windfall for Latina/o groups opposing him. Both MALDEF and PRtLDEF
were spared the tricky challenge of explaining to the public why they op-
posed "one of their own"' keeping credibility as advocacy groups that
represent Latina/os both conservative and liberal. Estrada was clearly quali-
fied, "bright," and Latino.299 But the Democratic-leaning MALDEF and
PRLDEF articulated principled reasons for opposing his nomination. In
addition, there might have been a fear that Estrada could become another
"stealth" minority nomination to the United States Supreme Court, like
Justice Thomas. Groups might have been projecting that Estrada's individual
interpretation of his judicial role, like Thomas's, would minimize whatever
diverse racial perspectives he would bring to the judging process. Finally,
there is something highly cynical about nominating to such an important
and visible position an exemplary conservative minority not raised in this
country and casting him as a racial success story while ignoring the core
structural problems that lie at the heart of the racial divide in the United
States."°
Battles over judicial nominations like Miguel Estrada's unfold because
we have settled for only a token number of minority judges on key
benches. The pluralistic process-based model of judging does not require
that a judicial racial perspective be either liberal or conservative. Rather, the
proposal that judicial benches contain a critical mass of minority judges
would relieve pressure from individual appointments. Then, minority judges
could be recognized as individuals who have different individual racial
perspectives and ideologies, but who as a group can provide a vigorous
challenge to the racial perspective of the majority. The politics of judicial
diversity appointments are vicious because once a minority judge is named
to a highly visible bench, it is unlikely that another minority judge will
subsequently be appointed. 01
299. Letter from Alberto Gonzalez, White House Counsel, to Dianne Feinstein,
United States Senator (Feb. 3, 2003) (on file with author).
300. See Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus, supra note 222, at
1523-30. Professor Derrick Bell's caustic commentary below reminds us that the narrative
of the lone "superstar" minority can subsume the racial reality of most minorities:
I marvel at how readily this society assimilates the myriad manifestations of
[Bilack protest and achievement. In that process, the continuing devastation
wrought by racial discrimination is minimized, even ignored, while those
who gained some reknown as they worked to end those injustices are trans-
formed into cultural reinforcements of the racial status quo. They become
walking proof that even minorities can make it in America through work
and sacrifice. For some, it is easy then to conclude that those minorities who
do not make it have only themselves to blame.
Derrick Bell, "Here Come de Judge": The Role of Faith in Progressive Decision-Making, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 12 (1999).
301. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The goal of a more inclusive mode of judging is elusive, yet it is an
ideal towards which pluralist polities must strive. At a doctrinal level, the
theoretical gaps as to why race matters in certain contexts and not in others
leads to a constitutional minefield for those who must apply the rule of law.
Doctrine that lacks a sense of why and when race matters develops in a
lopsided fashion, undermining the goals of inclusion and equality that both
equal protection doctrine and civil rights statutes seek to establish. Diversity
on the bench could help lead to the development of a more transparent
conversation of why and when race matters. But it is a fallacy to equate
descriptive minority representation with the substance of a deeper racial
dialogue on problematic constitutional issues. As empirical data show, judg-
ing is a complex process; individual minority judges bring to the judging
process multiple insights based not only on their lived experiences as mi-
norities but also on their individual ideologies and political
precommitments. Greater minority representation on the bench only in-
creases the chances that a racial dialogue can be developed. As Grutter notes,
establishing an environment in which intellectual diversity can take hold
requires complex judgments about how individual minorities will project
themselves into conversations about race. But more importantly, the key
ingredient is a critical mass of diverse minority judges-conservative and
liberal minorities; African Americans as well as Latinos, Asian Americans,
and others-who can make theoretically grounded arguments and tell ex-
periential narratives as to why race matters in specific constitutional
contexts.
The greatest impediment to achieving this goal is the harsh, elbow-
butting reality of the politics of judicial nominations. At both the electoral
and executive appointment levels, diversity on the judiciary has not gone
beyond the barrier-breaking "first" appointments-the first African Ameri-
can judge or the first Latino judge. While politics have made it very difficult
to move beyond the tokenism of "firsts," the political conversation regarding
what kind of diversity should be attained with minority nominees has
steadily expanded. For example, the Miguel Estrada conversation forced
some Latino advocacy groups to argue that a conservative minority from a
privileged class background who was not born and raised in the United
States could not truly identify with the racial experiences of the majority of
Latinos in this country.
The challenge is for the political dialogue of judicial nominations to
not deteriorate into we-they, zero-sum contests. Rather, the political rheto-
ric might begin to educate the polity as to how and why judges of different
racial backgrounds improve the quality and inclusiveness of the rule of law.
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